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Abstract
Following the experimental discovery of the Higgs boson, physicists explained the
discovery to the public by appealing to analogies with condensed matter physics. The
historical root of these analogies is the analogies to models of superconductivity that in-
spired the introduction of spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) into particle physics
in the early 1960s. We offer a historical and philosophical analysis of the analogies be-
tween the Higgs model of the electroweak (EW) interaction and the Ginsburg-Landau
(GL) and Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer (BCS) models of superconductivity, respectively.
The conclusion of our analysis is that both sets of analogies are purely formal in virtue
of the fact that they are accompanied by substantial physical disanalogies. In particu-
lar, the formal analogies do not map the temporal, causal, or modal structures of SSB in
superconductivity to temporal, causal, or modal structures in the Higgs model. These
substantial physical disanalogies mean that analogies to models of superconductivity
cannot supply the basis for the physical interpretation of EW SSB; however, an appre-
ciation of the contrast between the physical interpretations of SSB in superconductivity
and the Higgs model does help to some foundational issues. Unlike SSB in supercon-
ductivity, SSB in the Higgs sector of the Standard Model (without the addition of new
physics) is neither a temporal nor a causal process. We discuss the implications for
the ‘eating’ metaphor for mass gain in the Higgs model. Furthermore, the distinction
between the phenomenological GL model and the dynamical BCS model does not carry
over to EW models, which clarifies the desiderata for so-called ‘dynamical’ models of
EW SSB (e.g., minimal technicolor). Finally, the development of the Higgs model is
an illuminating case study for philosophers of science because it illustrates how purely
formal analogies can play a fruitful heuristic role in physics.
1 Introduction
The Higgs mechanism, and the application of spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) in par-
ticle physics more widely, has historical origins in condensed matter physics. According to
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the Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer (BCS) model of superconductivity, low-temperature super-
conductivity occurs when the ground state of a metal has a lower symmetry than the solid
itself (at sufficiently low temperatures), and when the metal is in this state, electrons con-
dense together to form bound states (Cooper pairs). Nambu noticed (in 1960) the formal
similarities between the BCS model and the Dirac equation, and so borrowed the concept for
what turned out to be an effective theory of quantum chromodynamics (QCD). With this
move, SSB became a valuable heuristic tool in particle physics. It was employed by Higgs,
Englert, Brout, and others in 1964 to introduce massive gauge bosons into quantum field
theory. The Higgs mechanism ended up being a key ingredient in the renormalizable theory
produced by the Glashow-Weinberg-Salam (GWS) electroweak (EW) unification (1967).
The aim of this paper is to determine what analogies to superconductivity reveal about
the physical interpretation of the Higgs mechanism. While there is a tradition of using
analogies to condensed matter physics to explain the Higgs mechanism and the Higgs boson
to a lay audience and to physics students, there has been a recent resurgence in such expla-
nations with the celebrated discovery of the Higgs boson at the Large Hadron Collider. One
of the best analogies of this type is David Miller’s from 1993, for which he won a bottle of
champagne in a competition from then U.K. Minister of Science William Waldegrave (and
which played a role in the UK’s approval of funding for the Large Hadron Collider). Miller
draws his analogy between three domains: British politics, solid state physics, and the Higgs
model. A room full of politicians evenly distributed is taken as the analogue of the Higgs
vacuum. As a noteworthy politician enters the room, the distribution of people distorts to
cluster around her, providing resistance to her motion through the room. The politician is
the analogue of a W or Z boson, the people clustering around her represent the interaction
between a particle and the Higgs field, and the resisted motion is the analogue of the acquisi-
tion of mass. Likewise, a rumor of scandal can cause clustering in the room, and this cluster
travels as the rumor spreads amongst the politicians. The cluster occurs without an external
politician (particle) present, and these clusters in the politician ‘field’ are the analogues of
the Higgs boson (Miller, 1993). Analogies such as this help the public and physics students
gain intuitive understanding of the formal framework of the Higgs mechanism. Whether
the analogies also convey information about the physical interpretation of the formalism
depends on a more detailed analysis of the types of analogies that have been successfully
employed. Our main analytical tool will be to clearly distinguish formal analogies between
superconductivity and EW SSB from material and physical analogies. We argue that the
Higgs model demonstrates that purely formal analogies can play a fruitful heuristic role in
physics; this is a case in which formal analogies are not underwritten by a further physical
or material analogy, yet have proven to be very useful.
The Higgs mechanism is a remarkably good case study of the heuristic use of analo-
gies in contemporary physics because it is widely recognized that there are two models of
superconductivity—the BCS and Ginzburg-Landau (GL) models—which support different
types of analogies. The BCS model is a dynamical model that offers a dynamical mechanism
for the transition from ‘normal’ to superconducting states (i.e., the formation of Cooper
pairs). In contrast, the GL model, first proposed by Ginzburg and Landau prior to the
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BCS model, is (merely) a phenomenological model because it does not offer a dynamical
mechanism for superconductivity. Formally, the Higgs model is clearly a closer analogue to
the GL model than the BCS model. The analogies to the two models of superconductivity
are widely recognized in historical accounts of the discoveries. For example, in his Nobel
prize address, Higgs explains that “Nambu’s models were inspired by the Bardeen, Cooper,
and Schrieffer theory (Bardeen et al., 1957), based on Bose condensation of Cooper pairs of
electrons: Goldstone used scalar fields, with a “wine bottle” potential to induce Bose con-
densation, as in the earlier Ginzburg-Landau theory” (2014, p. 851).1 There are also good
treatments of analogies to both models in the contemporary physics textbook and review
article literature. (For example, Marshak (1993), Quigg (2007), and Witten (2007) offer clear
presentations.) The success2 of the analogies to superconductivity in providing a heuristic
for formulating the Higgs model set another program in motion: the program of devising
a new model for electroweak interactions that is more closely analogous to the BCS model
than the GL model. A number of such dynamical SSB models have been proposed, including
the quark composite model, the electroweak perturbation model, and different versions of
technicolor.
The first part of the paper is devoted to a historical and philosophical analysis of the types
of analogies that hold between the Higgs model and the GL and BCS models, respectively.
For this purpose, we distinguish between three types of analogies: formal, physical and
material. We use Hesse’s account of analogies to frame our discussion. Roughly, formal
analogies map similar elements of the mathematical formalisms of the models; physical
analogies map elements of the models with similar physical interpretations; and material
analogies map the causal structures of the models. In Sec. 3 we give brief expositions of
the GL model, the BCS model, and the Higgs model. After identifying the formal analogies
between the BCS and GL models, respectively, and the Higgs model in Sec. 4, we turn
to the prospects for physical and material analogies between the models in Sec. 5. The
formal analogical mappings do not map the temporal, modal, or causal structures of the
superconductivity models to temporal, modal, or causal structures in the Higgs model. We
argue that these crucial differences between the physical interpretations of the analogues rule
out material and physical analogies between the BCS and GL models, respectively, and the
Higgs model. Furthermore, the distinction between phenomenological and dynamical models
gleaned from the GL and BCS models is not applicable to the Higgs model. The material and
physical disanalogies between the superconductivity models and the Higgs model also entail
that neither the BCS model nor the GL model supplies a guide for the physical interpretation
of the Higgs field or the Higgs boson.
1In the historical literature, Brown and Cao opine that “Nambu’s approach is ‘microscopic’, and compara-
ble to the BCS-Bogoliubov theory” whereas “Goldstone’s is ‘macroscopic’, in the sense of ‘phenomenological’,
comparable to the Landau-Ginzburg theory” (Brown and Cao, 1991, p. 232).
In his Nobel prize lecture, Nambu notes that “[t]he [Weinberg-Salam theory of electroweak unification]
resembles the Ginzburg-Landau description of superconductivity, which was shown to follow from the BCS
theory by Gor’kov” (Nambu, 2008, p.62).
2At least conceptually; the direct empirical success of the Higgs model of course took much longer to
establish.
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Our treatment of the Higgs mechanism is for the most part orthogonal to one of the
dominant strands in the philosophical literature. Earman (2002) draws attention to the
problem that, according to standard presentations of the Higgs mechanism in the contem-
porary physics literature, particles gain mass as a result of choosing a particular gauge; this
is at odds with philosophical accounts according to which a gauge symmetry is supposed to
represent “descriptive fluff,” a mere redundancy in the mathematical representation without
physical content. Earman thus demands that an adequate account of the Higgs mechanism
be gauge invariant in order to determine its physical interpretation. Our discussion of the
Higgs mechanism is for most part orthogonal to these issues because we focus on historical
presentations of the Higgs model. Analogies to superconductivity were most influential in
the development of the EW component of the Standard Model c.1960-6. At this time gauge
invariant presentations of SSB were current (Struyve (2011)). As a result, the analogies
examined here do not hinge on the choice of a particular gauge. The mass gain metaphor
will be discussed in its historical context in Sec. 5.5.
While our main conclusion is the negative one that models of superconductivity do not
help to inform the physical interpretation of the Higgs mechanism, the points of contrast with
superconductivity do serve to clarify some foundational issues, particularly regarding the role
of time in the Higgs model. We emphasize that the scope of our arguments in Sections 3-5
(i.e., excluding Sec. 6) is limited to the Higgs mechanism as presented in the Standard Model
of particle physics. We take it that this focus on the theoretical presentation of EW SSB in
the Standard Model is in keeping with most of the philosophical discussion of EW SSB to
date. To clarify, questions about the physical interpretation of SSB in the Higgs sector of the
Standard Model are questions about the possible world described by the Higgs model. This
possible world may well not be the actual world. In particular, one of the main points that
we want to stress to our philosophical audience is that—unlike SSB in superconductivity—
SSB in the Higgs model is not a temporal process. This is a partial answer to questions
raised by Huggett in (Cao, 1999, pp.376-377) and Cao in (Hoddeson, 1997, pp. 504-505).
Of course, it may turn out that in our actual world EW SSB is a temporal process (e.g.,
that a phase transition occurred in the early universe). This type of description could only
be offered by a model of EW SSB other than the Higgs model. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine how physicists could reach the conclusion that an EW phase transition occurred
in the early universe without having developed a model that describes such a transition.
Finite temperature field theory (aka thermal field theory) was devised in part to provide
a theoretical framework for SSB in cosmology. The aim of finite temperature field theory
is to present a single theoretical framework that both contains a temperature variable and
is a (relativistic) quantum field theory (see, e.g., Le Bellac (2000)). Finite temperature
field theory presents new physics that goes beyond the Standard Model, and its project of
amalgamating statistical mechanics and QFT goes well beyond the strict analogies between
QFT and condensed matter systems considered here. Philosophical discussions of EW SSB
sometimes lump the Higgs model and finite temperature field theory together and describe
the EW SSB as a phase transition that possibly occurred once in the early universe (e.g.,
(Wuthrich, 2012, p.10, footnote 6)). We hope that this paper will serve as encouragement
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for philosophers interested in EW SSB as a temporal process to attend to theories that go
beyond the Standard Model.
In Sec. 6, we waive the restriction in force in the rest of the paper in order to consider
current and past attempts to go beyond the Standard Model (BSM models) by constructing
a model for EW SSB that is more closely analogous to the BCS model (e.g., the minimal
technicolor model). The strategy common to these so-called dynamical models is to intro-
duce a composite particle that is analogous to the Cooper pair. We argue that, since the
Higgs model cannot be considered a phenomenological model in the same sense as the GL
model, these ‘dynamical’ models cannot be regarded as supplying a causal-dynamical under-
pinning for the Higgs model in the manner that the BCS model supplies a causal-dynamical
underpinning for the GL model. However, there remain other motivations for pursuing these
‘dynamical’ SSB models. Pushing analogies with superconductivity as far as possible was
(and is) a reasonable heuristic to employ for developing new Lagrangian models of the EW
interaction. As is the case for other applications of analogical reasoning in the history of
physics, the measure of success for the resulting models is passing empirical tests. Two of
the dynamical SSB models discussed below have failed empirical tests and the verdict is still
out on the third (minimal technicolor). (By comparison, so far the Higgs model has passed
empirical tests.)
In this paper we focus on the aspects of the history that are relevant to philosophical
and interpretive issues under consideration. As a result, our presentation of the history is
not comprehensive. For further historical background, consult Hoddeson (1997) and recent
papers by the Wuppertal research collaboration on the epistemology of the Large Hadron
Collider (e.g., Sto¨ltzner (2014)). We regard our analysis of analogies with superconductivity
as complementary to the thesis in Koraca (2011) that there is “a practical unity” between
superconductivity and the Higgs mechanism which, historically, was a product of the methods
for SSB in both being co-developed between the fields of condensed matter and high energy
physics. Another historical case study of the utility of formal analogies in physics is to be
found in Gingras (2015), which studies Einstein’s discovery of wave-particle duality.
2 Material, physical, and formal analogies
The general accounts of analogies in science offered by Hesse, Bartha (articulation model),
and Holyoak and Thagard (multi-constraint theory) disagree on many details, but are in
agreement that analogies have played an important heuristic role in many scientific discover-
ies. They also agree that analogical reasoning does not take the form of deductive argument;
empirical testing is what determines whether an analogical inference has a true conclusion.
The applications of analogies to the BCS model in particle physics fit into this general tem-
plate: they served as a useful heuristic for producing analogical models of EW SSB which
have been (and continue to be) subject to empirical test.
For our purposes, it is important to distinguish between different types of analogies. We
will draw on distinctions between material, physical, and formal analogies. To frame these
distinctions, consider Hesse’s account. Hesse introduced the now-familiar distinction between
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horizontal and vertical relations : horizontal relations are mappings between objects in the
source and target domains and vertical relations are mappings between objects within one
domain. For example, in an analogy drawn between the earth (source domain) and the moon
(target domain), horizontal relations could include that the bodies are both approximately
spherical and that the earth has an atmosphere while the moon has no atmosphere (1966,
pp. 58-59). The similarity in respect of being approximately spherical is a positive analogy
and the difference in respect of having an atmosphere is a negative analogy. The presence
of human beings could be considered a neutral analogy : it is not known (in 1966) whether
human beings are present on the moon. An argument from analogy may be formulated with
the positive and negative analogies (i.e., horizontal relations) between the earth and moon
and the presence of humans on earth as premises and the presence of humans on the moon
as the conclusion. Hesse contends that the strength of arguments from analogy rests on
the causal relations between the properties that are related through positive and negative
analogies. Causal relations are Hesse’s paradigm case of vertical relations.3 For example,
the presence of an atmosphere on earth is known to be causally related to sustaining human
life on earth; this is a vertical relation within the source domain. The fact that presence of
an atmosphere is part of the negative analogy undermines the argument from analogy to the
conclusion that there are humans on the moon.
Hesse introduced a distinction between material and formal analogies. Material analogies
invoke “pre-theoretic analogies between observables4... which enable predictions to be made
from a model” (p. 68). A further condition on material analogies is that the vertical relations
invoked be causal relations of the same kind in both the source and target domains. In
contrast, a formal analogy involves only “the one-to-one correspondence between different
interpretations of the same formal [i.e., uninterpreted] theory” (p. 68). Put another way,
formal analogies are cases in which there is “no horizontal similarity independent of the
vertical relation” (p. 68). The paradigm case of a formal analogy is the application of the
same equation (with different physical interpretations) in distinct domains. An analogy is
merely formal—and not material—if the two physical theories employing this equation give
an interpretation that does not invoke causal relations of the same kind.
There is another type of analogy that is also relevant. Horizontal relations can reflect
physical similarities between the source and target domains without being implicated in
causal vertical relations. Such horizontal relations are not material, but not purely formal
either. We shall label this intermediate case physical analogy. Bartha (2010) also distin-
guishes this category of analogy (pp. 207-210).
To sum up, these three types of analogy are related as follows: material analogies are
also physical and formal; physical analogies may also be formal (depending on the vertical
3Causal relations are also of central importance for Holyoak and Thagard (1995), though for different
reasons: causal relations are the paradigm case of higher-order structural relations and analogies which map
higher-order relations are stronger because this increases the degree of mapping between the structures of
the source and target systems (pp. 36-37).
4Though Hesse focuses on observables, we generalize our focus to theoretical variables. Entities or vari-
ables in the models that aren’t observable can contribute to material analogies if they are to be interpreted
as physically significant by the lights of the theory.
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relations), but not material; formal analogies may be neither material nor formal. Formal
analogies are compatible with material and physical disanalogies that block the transfer of
the physical interpretation from one model to the other.
Since the initial work by Nambu and Jona-Lasinio (among others) in the early 1960s,
physicists have developed models for electroweak SSB based on different types of analogies
to superconductivity. The different types of analogies correspond to the use of different
models of SSB in superconductivity as analogues. As we shall see, the BCS model is a
causal-dynamical model and the GL model is a phenomenological model which does not
posit a causal-dynamical mechanism for the breaking of the symmetry. Consequently, only
the BCS model can support material analogies. Analogies to the GL model are formal;
we will investigate whether they are also physical. After providing an overview of the GL,
BCS, and Higgs models, our approach will be to first identify the formal analogies between
the GL and the Higgs models and the BCS and the Higgs models, and then to determine
whether these analogies are also physical (or material, in the case of the BCS model). Our
conclusion is that this is a case in which the formal analogies are accompanied by physical
disanalogies rather than analogies. In Sec. 6 we will consider the status of the analogies to
the BCS model invoked by several of the dynamical SSB models that have been proposed as
alternatives to the Higgs model.
3 The GL, BCS, and Higgs models
Anderson and Nambu were among the first physicists to recognize analogies between the BCS
model of superconductivity and particle physics. The features of the model that attracted
their attention were the presence of a ‘heavy’ photon (i.e., a photon with effective mass)
and the absence of massless Goldstone bosons. In Nambu’s words, in a superconductor the
Goldstone “mode mixes with the coulomb [sic] interaction among the electrons because of
their common long-range nature, and turns into the well-known plasmons” (Nambu, 2008,
p. 60). From the perspective of particle physics, both features were noteworthy because
they contradicted widely held beliefs in the particle physics community. Circa 1962 particle
physicists believed that the gauge bosons in Yang-Mills type theories—such as the photon
in electromagnetism—are necessarily massless. Furthermore, on the strength of Goldstone’s
theorem, particle physicists believed that broken symmetries are necessarily accompanied by
massless Goldstone bosons, and experiments had not turned up unaccounted-for massless
particles.5 Goldstone’s theorem—that continuous symmetries that are spontaneously broken
in relativistic QFT are necessarily accompanied by massless zero-spin particles (“Goldstone
bosons”) was conjectured in Goldstone (1961) and proven in Goldstone et al. (1962).
Nambu first used the analogy from the BCS model of superconductivity to formulate a
particle physics model. The idea of carrying the symmetry breaking apparatus over to a
particle physics setting was motivated simply by the formal similarity of the Bogoliubov-
5Jona-Lasinio (2003) points out a third misconception of particle physicists in the late 1950s: the “strict
dogma” that the vacuum “should not possess observable physical properties and all the symmetries of the
theory, implemented by unitary operators, should leave it invariant” (p. 316).
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Valantin equations ((6) below) to the Dirac equation. The mapping is made explicit by
Nambu:
the gap ∆ goes over to the mass M , which breaks chirality ∼ γ5 rather than
the ordinary charge ∼ 1: the axial current is the analog of the electromagnetic
vector current in the BCS theory... [C]hiral symmetry is compatible with a finite
nucleon mass M provided that there exists a massless pseudoscalar [Goldstone]
boson. (p. 60)
This work was continued further by Nambu and Jona-Lasinio (NJL), who constructed
an effective model of composite nucleons based on the analogy with BCS theory, in which
nucleons played the role of composite Cooper pairs, and the energy gap of the BCS theory
was replaced by the resulting mass of the nucleons. The analogous broken symmetry in this
model is the global U(1) chiral symmetry. Regarding the pions as approximately massless
(compared to the larger nucleons), they play the role of the Goldstone bosons upon SSB.
As Nambu explains, from a contemporary perspective, the NJL model “may be regarded as
an effective theory for QCD with respect to generation of the so-called constituent masses.
One is interested in the low energy degrees of freedom on a scale smaller than some cut-off
Λ” (2008, p. 62).
The NJL model hinted at the possibility of solving the problem of massive mediating
bosons in Yang-Mills gauge theories through SSB. However, Goldstone’s theorem posed an
obstacle to this task because the massless Goldstone bosons accompanying SSB should have
been easy to produce in experiments. Ironically, examples of Goldstone bosons in solid state
physics (e.g., phonons, spin waves) may have served as inspiration for Goldstone’s theorem
(Anderson, 1963, p. 441). As Anderson recalled many years later,
Another roadblock [to EW theory] was the apparent necessity of allowing a num-
ber of Goldstone bosons into the theory, which would mean that the theory would
be full of massless bosons—which didn’t exist! When I heard in 1962 that people
considered this a real obstacle, I sent off a short paper saying “forget it—the gap
is empty in a real superconductor!” (2015).
Roughly speaking, the intuitive lesson drawn from superconductivity was that there are in
fact no zero mass problems in theories in which gauge bosons and Goldstone bosons are
suitably coupled. To put the point in an uncontroversial but less colorful way, models of
superconductivity demonstrated that particle physicists’ separate assumptions about the
necessity of massless gauge bosons and massless Goldstone bosons failed when combined
(i.e., in the context of gauge theories with spontaneously broken symmetries). In Higgs’
words,
...the spontaneous breakdown program of Nambu et al and the gauge field pro-
gram of Salam et al stand or fall together. Each saves the other from the zero-
mass difficulty. (1966, p. 145)
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Anderson has a more colorful way of stating the moral: “We conclude, then, that the Gold-
stone zero-mass difficulty is not a serious one, because we can probably cancel it off against
an equal Yang-Mills zero-mass problem” (1963, p. 442). As these quotes indicate, theories
of superconductivity and proposed quantum field theories were judged relevantly similar in
virtue of being Yang-Mills-type theories; this was the primary meaning accorded to the term
gauge theory (see Weatherall (2015)).
Higgs (1964), among others, took up Anderson’s suggestion, and showed how SSB of a
gauge symmetry could eliminate the Goldstone boson, resulting in a massive vector boson
and a massive scalar boson, now known as the Higgs boson. The mechanism was applied by
Weinberg (1967)—building on the work of Salam and Glashow—to the non-Abelian SU(2)×
U(1) symmetry group unifying electromagnetism and the weak force. The resulting theory
is known as GWS electroweak theory, which is a staple of the Standard Model of particle
physics.6
While historically the BCS model was the superconductivity analogue that played the
central role in this sequence of developments, its precursor—the GL model—is important
for the analysis of the analogies. The dynamical BCS model entails the phenomenological
GL model in the sense that (given suitable background assumptions) near the critical tem-
perature the GL equations can be derived from the BCS equations. The remainder of this
section outlines all three of the models—GL, BCS, and Higgs.
3.1 The Ginzburg-Landau phenomenological model for supercon-
ductivity
The Ginzburg-Landau (GL) model was an attempt from 1950 to build a phenomenological
model of superconductivity. For this reason, Ginzburg and Landau did not attempt to justify
certain choices made within their model, beyond appeal to consistency and agreement with
experiment. They note that, in any situation involving second order phase transitions, “there
always enters some parameter [which] differs from zero in the ordered phase and which equals
zero in the disordered phase” (Ginzburg and Landau, 2009, p. 115). Since the transition to a
superconducting state is a second order phase transition, they propose an order parameter ψ,
which can be interpreted as representing an effective wavefunction for the superconducting
electrons,7 that vanishes above some critical temperature, Tc. Starting from the general
expansion of free energy about the critical temperature—the lowest order expansion that
accommodates the phenomena—in the absence of other interactions, the free energy density
6This historical overview is meant to provide a streamlined narrative of the events leading from BCS
theory to the Higgs mechanism in electroweak theory. For a more thorough account, see Koraca (2011), or
Hoddeson (1997).
7This is the contemporary interpretation. As Kadanoff (2013) persuasively argues, the interpretation
of ψ as representing a collection of particles—the superconducting electrons—was a moral that took years
for both the Russian and American physics communities to fully absorb. Ginzburg and Landau originally
proposed a microscopic definition of ψ (Kadanoff, 2013, pp. 814-5). Kadanoff presents evidence that as late
as 1962 Bardeen himself did not recognize the significance of the collective wavefunction (pp. 817-8).
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can be written as
Fs = Fn + a |ψ|2 + b
2
|ψ|4 , (1)
where Fn represents the free energy density of the ‘normal’ metal (i.e., the metal in the
‘normal’, as opposed to superconducting, state). This general form was previously confirmed
for other systems undergoing second order phase transitions, and was thus considered a
reasonable hypothesis. (Presumably this is another formal analogy!) In addition to these
terms they include the energy density given by a constant magnetic field, H2/2pi, and the
gauge covariant derivative linking wavefunction ψ to the electromagnetic field, in analogy
with the Schro¨dinger equation coupled to the electromagnetic field. The final form of the
free energy density is given by
Fs = Fn + |Diψ|2 + a|ψ|2 + b
2
|ψ|4 + H
2
8pi
(2)
withDi =
1
2m∗ (∇− ie∗A) the three-dimensional covariant derivative andm∗ and e∗ empirically-
determined parameters. By requiring that |ψ|2 > 0 for T < Tc, a is forced to be negative.
Along with certain other constraints on the free energy (e.g. order parameter continuously
approaches 0 at T → Tc), the simplest form for the order parameter (for T ≤ Tc) is
|ψ|2 = Tc − T
bc
(
da
dT
)
c
, (3)
where bc is the value of the parameter b at Tc, and both a and b are assumed to be functions
of temperature. From these basic equations, many of the phenomenological features of
superconductors are derived.8
The GL model is widely regarded as a phenomenological model, in contrast to the dy-
namical BCS model of superconductivity. The following features characterize the GL model
as phenomenological :
1. descriptions : The GL model quantifies the phenomena related to superconductivity,
including SSB. The order parameter goes from zero to a finite value when the tempera-
ture goes below Tc. This is a description of the process of SSB, but not an explanation
of the underlying causes.
2. collections of constituents : ψ(x) is the condensate wave function, which represents
the collection of superconducting electrons (e.g., as opposed to one or two elementary
particles). The GL model focuses on a collective description of the phenomena.
3. parameters are empirical inputs : Parameters a, b, m∗, and e∗ are not specified by the
model. They are empirical inputs or free parameters which are set to make the model
8For a presentation geared toward mathematicians, see Witten (2007). This presentation was meant to
retain the original heuristic flavour of the model as presented by Ginzburg and Landau in 1950.
10
fit with the results of experiments. For example, the penetration depth d and the
coherence length l, both measurable quantities, are given by:
d =
√
m∗b
4pie∗a
; l =
1√
2m∗|a| , (4)
which provide constraints on the relationships between the free parameters. Only when
the GL equations are derived from the BCS equations (including the micro-physical
description of Cooper pairs) can it be determined that the parameters e∗ and m∗ are
twice the electron’s charge and mass, respectively.
3.2 The BCS dynamical model of superconductivity
At the time the BCS model was proposed, many phenomenological models of superconduc-
tivity already existed, including the GL model. One of the successes of the BCS model
was that it provided a micro-level description of superconductivity, and served to provide
a satisfying causal explanation of the phenomenon. In order to examine the details of the
analogy between SSB in the Higgs and BCS models, it will be necessary to survey some of
the details of the BCS model. This presentation follows Emch (2007, section 5.1), and is
meant as a brief explication of the relevant aspects of the formalism. For more details, see
Bardeen et al. (1957).
The starting points for the BCS model are Cooper pairs, thought to be “molecules” of two
electrons interacting via a mediating phonon. Phonons are collective excitations associated
with the quantized vibrational modes of the ionic lattice in the metal. This interaction was
found to be attractive for electrons of anticorrelated spin and momentum. The Hamiltonian
taken to represent the electron-phonon interaction in a large solid is
HΛ =
∑
p,s
ωpa
∗
s,pas,p +
∑
p,p′
b∗pvp,p′bp′ (5)
where Λ is the finite volume extent of the system, ωp is the energy of a free electron of
momentum p, a∗s,p, as,p are the creation and annihilation operators for a spin s electron of
momentum p, b∗p = a
∗
↑,pa
∗
↓,−p is the creation operator for the Cooper pair; b
∗
pvp,p′bp′ gives the
interaction energy between two Cooper pairs. The terms in the Hamiltonian are represen-
tative of a fruitful general strategy in condensed matter physics: one treats the interactions
between the many elementary constituents of a system as stable particles, and then posits
that the interactions between these stable quasiparticles are of a simple nature.9
This formulation of the interaction hides the temperature-dependence of the interac-
tion strength.10 A more revealing, although approximate, form of (5) is given through a
9For more insight, see Kadanoff (2013) or Anderson (1997).
10The presence and number of Cooper pairs implicitly depends on the temperature. At low temperatures,
electrons will have fewer accessible momentum states, and it is thus more likely that anticorrelated pairs will
be found.
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Bogoliubov-Valantin transformation of operators
γ↑,p =
(
∆∗pa↑,p + [Ep − ωp] a∗↓,−p
)
/Dp
γ↓,p =
(
[ωp − Ep] a∗↑,−p + ∆∗pa↓,p
)
/Dp,
(6)
where ∆p is to become the order parameter for the theory, and satisfies the self-consistency
equation
∆p = −
∑
p′
vp,p′
∆p′
2Ep′
tanh
(
1
2
βEp′
)
, (7)
and
Ep =
(
ω2p + ∆p∆
∗
p
)1
2
Dp =
(
[Ep − ωp]2 + ∆p∆∗p
)1
2 .
The new, approximate Hamiltonian then takes the form
H˜Λ =
∑
p,s
Epγ
∗
s,pγs,p, (8)
and includes an explicit temperature dependence via β = (kT )−1 in the order parameter ∆p.
The original authors claimed that the approximate and original Hamiltonians coincide in the
limit of infinite volume Λ → ∞, so that (8) is an exact expression at the thermodynamic
limit (p. 1180).11
For most temperatures, ∆ = 0 is the energetically favourable solution, and there the
energy spectra of H and H˜ coincide. However, there is a critical temperature Tc = 1/kβc
below which a solution ∆ 6= 0 becomes more energetically stable, and it is this phase that
corresponds to the superconducting phase. In this case, there is a degenerate set of lowest
energy states, each of which has a fixed phase, breaking the global U(1) symmetry. (8)
provides a more explicit description of the broken symmetry, which is marked by the energy
gap ∆ 6= 0 between the superconducting ground states and the excited ‘normal’ phase.
In this regime electrons couple to form Cooper pair bosons. Cooper pairs are permitted to
collectively condense into the energetically favoured superconducting ground state in virtue of
being bosons: fermions are prohibited from occupying identical states by the Pauli exclusion
principle.12 The finite energy gap ∆ inhibits excitations out of the superconducting ground
state. This amounts to a non-negligible fraction of the superconductor’s electrons occupying
a single state, resulting in a macroscopic quantum system.
11At the thermodynamic limit, one may worry that we are somehow getting different physics by reshuﬄing
the degrees of freedom from the form of (5) to (8), while the two are supposed to describe the same physical
situation. Similar worries are shared by philosophers examining the Higgs mechanism. In the case of the
BCS model, these issues were resolved by Haag (1962) (according to Emch (2007, p. 1123)). The fact that
the approximation here becomes exact in the thermodynamic limit is a fact unique to BCS theory, finding
(as far as we are aware) no analogue in QFT.
12As Kadanoff (2013) emphasizes, BCS disavow the connection with Bose-Einstein condensates. See his
Sec. 3.2
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In 1959 Gor’kov derived the GL equations from the BCS equations for systems near the
critical temperature. He related the two sets of equations by setting the collective wave
function and order parameter ψ in the GL model to be proportional to the order parameter
∆ in the BCS model (Gor’kov, 1959, p. 1366). The derivation entails that m∗ in Di (eq.
(2)) is the mass of the Cooper pair 2m and that the e∗ is the charge of the Cooper pair
2e. For our purposes of analyzing the analogies to EW SSB, the main focus will be the
GL and BCS equations. We will thus treat the two models separately; the fact that (given
suitable background assumptions) the BCS equations entail the GL equations is incidental
to our analysis. However, for the purpose of explaining the phenomena of superconductivity,
Kadanoff emphasizes that both the micro-physical account of the origins of superconduc-
tivity supplied by the BCS model and a macroscopic understanding of the quantum wave
function ψ as representing the entire condensate of superconducting electrons—and not a
single particle—are necessary. With this additional understanding we see that, below Tc,
the Cooper pairs are of sufficiently low energy to collectively condense into the ground state,
forming a Bose-Einstein condensate of lowest energy Cooper pairs.
In this ground state, however, the global U(1) gauge symmetry characteristic of elec-
tromagnetic interactions is broken, since the Cooper pairs condense to form a phase-rigid
system. It was later shown that, for the condensate wavefunction, the phase angle is related
to the conjugate momentum in such a way as to keep the wavefunction’s velocity gauge in-
variant (see Kadanoff (2013, p. 818)). This entails a rigidity preventing the spatial variation
of the phase in the superconducting state. When an external magnetic field is applied to the
superconductor, the rigid phase prohibits coupling within the interior of the superconductor,
“pushing” the magnetic field out of the material. This is the explanation for the Meissner
effect: external magnetic fields vanish within the superconductor. Beyond a small penetra-
tion depth, neither electric nor magnetic fields will be present within the superconductor.
The short range of the electromagnetic interaction is often regarded as an indication of the
effective mass of a photon upon entering the phase-locked superconductor.
The BCS model is characterized as dynamical by contrast with the GL model. The follow-
ing features—which are opposed to the features identified in Sec. 3.1 as being characteristic
of the phenomenological GL model—mark the BCS model as a dynamical model:
1. causal explanations :13 The BCS model provides an explanation in terms of underlying
interactions and energy levels that accounts for the phase transition (and accompany-
ing SSB) from a normal state to a superconducting state. This is a causal explanation
of superconductivity. The cause of the phase transition is that more energetically
favourable states become available for the conducting electrons; when these lower en-
ergy ground states become possible, pairs of electrons form Cooper pairs and then
condense into the lower energy ground states.
13Note again Kadanoff’s point that explanations of the phenomenology of superconductivity require an
understanding of the macroscopic significance of the wavefunction supplied by the GL model as well as the
microscopic underpinnings supplied by the BCS model. The point here is just that the BCS model introduced
ingredients essential for having an explanation (as opposed to merely a description) of the phase transition.
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2. micro-constituents : The model employs an appeal to the configuration of micro-constituents
of the superconductor (i.e., photons, phonons, electrons, etc.). In particular, the linch-
pins of the model are the Cooper pairs, which are composites of two electrons.
3. parameters theoretical inputs : The majority of the explanatory parameters in the the-
ory arise from theoretical, not empirical, considerations. (e.g., masses, energies of the
particles)
3.3 The Abelian U(1) Higgs model
We will provide a brief overview of the Higgs mechanism in the simpler Abelian U(1) case.14
This is a standard approach in both the philosophical literature and physics textbooks be-
cause the relevant content remains the same, but we avoid getting bogged down in the
lengthy expressions used in the breaking of electroweak SU(2) × U(1) symmetry. Further-
more, we follow the standard contemporary physics textbook presentation of the Abelian
Higgs mechanism. To foreshadow: We include this standard presentation of the Higgs mech-
anism to make contact with the contemporary philosophy and physics literature, but our
historically-informed analysis is in fact based on earlier, gauge-invariant presentations of the
Higgs mechanism.
The starting point for the Abelian Higgs mechanism is the Lagrangian
L = (Dµφ)† (Dµφ)− VH(φ)− 1
4
FµνF
µν (9)
where φ(x) is a complex classical field over spacetime, Fµν = ∂µAν−∂νAµ is the electromag-
netic tensor, Dµ = ∂µ− igAµ is the gauge covariant derivative, and VH(φ) = µ2φ†φ+λ(φ†φ)2
is the famous Higgs Mexican hat potential. L is invariant under the gauge transformation
φ → exp(iα(x))φ, Aµ → Aµ − (1/g)∂µα(x). For µ2 > 0, the vacuum (minimum energy,
Poincare´ invariant solution) is the usual one at φ = 0, for which all vacuum expectation
values (VEVs) are 0. However, when µ2 < 0, the vacuum is characterized by:
〈0|φ |0〉 = v√
2
; v =
√
−µ2
2λ
. (10)
Thus the minimum energy solution is not at φ = 0; in fact, there exist a continuous number
of possible solutions, corresponding to φ∗φ = v/
√
2, the circle of minimum energy in the
potential VH(φ).
What interests physicists are excitations to the field near the vacuum energy v, since we
suppose that these are the only energies (currently) accessible by experiment. So we rewrite
φ in terms of an excitation field ρ, such that
φ(x) =
1√
2
(v + ρ(x)) eiG(x)/v. (11)
14This presentation follows Marshak (1993, section 4.4a) in the style of notation used. For different
presentations of the same content, see Earman (2003), Martin (2003), or Wuthrich (2012), among numerous
others. In particular, we use a polar decomposition for the complex scalar field φ.
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This can be thought of as fixing the gauge α(x) = G(x)/v; in order to fully fix the gauge,
we must also define
Aµ → Bµ = Aµ − 1
gv
∂µG(x). (12)
Fixing the gauge amounts to selecting one out of the infinite number of possible vacuum
states, thereby breaking the gauge symmetry. Plugging in these values, we can rewrite the
Lagrangian (neglecting terms cubic or higher)
L′ = −1
4
BµνB
µν +
1
2
(gv)2BµB
µ +
1
2
(∂µρ(x))
2 − µ2ρ(x)2, (13)
where Bµν is the counterpart of Fµν defined in terms of Bµ. L′ is interpreted as containing a
massive vector field Bµ with mass gv, and an additional scalar field ρ, with mass
√
2 |µ|. L′
does not contain G(x), which is interpreted as the massless field associated with the Gold-
stone bosons. The Goldstone bosons are eliminated through the correct choice of gauge.
Thus, a renormalizable theory that started with massless mediating bosons has been con-
verted to a theory involving massive mediating bosons, without spoiling the renormalizability
of the theory.
Earman (2002) critiques the role that the choice of the unitary gauge plays in this stan-
dard presentation of the Higgs mechanism. The problem is that a gauge symmetry (according
to philosophical accounts) is supposed to represent “descriptive fluff,” a mere redundancy in
the mathematical formalism of QFT. All physically relevant parameters are thus required to
be gauge invariant. In particular, whether the dynamical equations describe a massive Higgs
boson or a massless Goldstone boson should not depend on the choice of gauge. Earman
thus rejects the “just-so stories” that particles gain mass “by eating the Higgs field” (2002, p.
1239). In order to determine the correct physical interpretation of the Higgs mechanism, he
therefore demands a gauge invariant presentation. Morrison (2003), Smeenk (2006), Struyve
(2011), and Lyre (2008) (among others) offer various approaches to this problem.
The issues taken up in this paper are for the most part orthogonal to these issues pertain-
ing to the choice of gauge. One reason for this is historical circumstances. Struyve (2011)
points out that the early treatments of the Abelian Higgs model in Higgs (1966) and of the
non-Abelian Higgs model in Kibble (1967) were in fact gauge invariant. Struvye reviews
Higgs’ 1966 gauge invariant presentation of the Abelian Higgs model. According to Struyve,
the presentation of the Abelian Higgs model rehearsed above with the appeal to the unitary
gauge was first employed by Weinberg as a simpler way of obtaining Kibble’s results, and was
then picked up in the textbook literature (p. 226). The historical period in which analogies
to the BCS model influenced the formulation of the EW component of the Standard Model
was c.1960-6, when the gauge invariant presentations of the Higgs mechanism were current.
Moreover, most of the analogies to superconductivity are based on the initial Lagrangian (9)
and other expressions involving φ(x) rather than the Lagrangian (13) and ρ(x).15 For the
15An exception is the discussion of the physical interpretation of the Higgs field in Sec. 5.6. However, as
Struyve stresses, the gauge invariant presentation of the Abelian Higgs model results in the same effective
Lagrangian, including fields with the same masses (p. 230).
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purposes of analyzing the historically important analogies between the BCS and Higgs mod-
els, details related to how SSB is formally implemented are not relevant. We will return to
the question of how analogies to superconductivity inform the interpretation of the popular
‘eating’ metaphor for mass acquisition in Sec. 5.5.
4 Formal analogies between the Higgs mechanism and
superconductivity
The types of analogies (and disanalogies) that obtain between the Higgs model and the two
models of superconductivity will be evaluated in detail below. As an aid to keeping track of
the horizontal relations, we provide three tables highlighting the relevant similarities. Formal
analogies will be examined in this section and potential material and physical analogies will
be scrutinized in the next section.
Table 1: Analogies between superconductor models and the Higgs model
Superconductor models Higgs model
U(1) broken (global) gauge symmetry group SU(2)× U(1) broken (local) gauge symme-
try group
(limited-range) photon with effective mass
(two transverse components)
massive W , Z bosons
plasmon with massive longitudinal compo-
nent
massive Higgs boson
no analogue massless photon
Table 2: Analogies between the GL model and the Higgs model
GL model Higgs model
free energy density of superconducting state
Fs
Lagrangian L
a|ψ(x)|2 + b
2
|ψ(x)|4 VH = µ2|φ(x)|2 + λ|φ(x)|4
collective wave function for superconducting
electrons ψ(x) as the order parameter
scalar particle field φ(x) as the order param-
eter
T no analogue
Table 3: Analogies between the BCS model and the Higgs model
BCS model Higgs model
energy gap ∆ as the order parameter vacuum energy 〈0|φ |0〉 as the order param-
eter
composite Cooper pairs no analogue
T no analogue
Anderson-Bogoliubov collective mode Higgs boson
no analogue Higgs field
Without even entering into the details, it is apparent that the Higgs model is more closely
analogous to the GL model than the BCS model: the composite Cooper pairs play a pivotal
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role in the dynamical account of SSB offered by the BCS model and there is no analogue of
the formation of Cooper pairs in the Higgs model; in contrast, there are analogues for all of
the load-bearing elements of the GL model in the Higgs model (including, most importantly,
the collective wave function). As we work through the analogies, it will also be helpful to bear
in mind that some of the vertical relations in the dynamical BCS model are causal relations,
while the vertical relations in the phenomenological GL model do not include causal relations.
As a result, there is the potential for material analogies between the BCS and Higgs models,
but not between the GL and Higgs models. These two circumstances supply motivation
for alternatives to the Higgs model known as dynamical symmetry breaking models. The
analogy between the Anderson-Bogoliubov collective mode and the Higgs boson came to
light only recently, and will be discussed in Sec. 5.6.
4.1 Basic formal analogies to the Higgs model common to the GL
and BCS models (Table 1)
As already mentioned, the possibility of an analogous mass gain for gauge bosons in par-
ticle physics motivated a close examination of the BCS model. This analogy predates the
construction of a model of SSB including the Higgs boson and the Higgs field. It is clearly
spelled out in Anderson (1963), which predates Higgs’ 1964 paper and does not contain any
details of the Higgs mechanism or Higgs potential (and no mention of the Higgs boson).
Both the Higgs mechanism and SSB in models of superconductivity involve the breaking
of a gauge symmetry. Electromagnetism and Yang-Mills theories are the paradigms for the-
ories with gauge symmetries. A gauge symmetry is an internal symmetry of the equations
of motion. This means that the dependent variables in the Lagrangian or Hamiltonian are
invariant under a symmetry group. Note that this definition includes both global and local
gauge symmetries. A local symmetry group is parametrized by real functions of space(time)
variables and a global symmetry group is not dependent on the space(time) variables. Ac-
cording to the standard accounts presented above, the superconductivity models represent
the breaking of the global U(1) gauge symmetry while the Higgs model represents the break-
ing of a local gauge symmetry.16 While this is a formal disanalogy between the two cases
16Morrison (2012) draws on a presentation of SSB in superconductors in Weinberg (1986) that identifies
local U(1) as the broken symmetry. Interestingly, Weinberg’s approach to superconductivity is the converse
of ours: he aims to “help those who like myself are more at home at high energy than at low temperature,
to appreciate the lessons of superconductivity” by reading the particle physics treatment of SSB back into
superconductivity, while we aim to trace the flow of SSB ideas in the other direction, from superconductivity
into particle physics (p. 43). More specifically, Weinberg derives a Lagrangian by introducing a Nambu-
Goldstone field and running an analogue of the gauge argument surveyed in Sec. 3.3. The derived Lagrangian
differs from both the GL and BCS Lagrangians. (However, as Weinberg notes, many of his arguments—
including the ones cited by Morrison—are adapted from standard presentations of the GL model (p. 46).
Morrison’s conclusion that phenomenological properties of superconductors are emergent in virtue of follow-
ing from SSB independently of the details of the microphysics (i.e., Cooper pairing in the BCS model) can
thus be supported by appealing to the GL model.) It is interesting to note that Weinberg himself seems
to recognize that he is relying on a formal analogy between particle physics and superconductivity that is
accompanied by salient physical disanalogies (see footnote *) on p.45 and the discussion on pp.52-53).
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that is important for understanding some aspects of the models, it is not important for trac-
ing the historical analogies that we want to highlight in this paper. Note also that one can
start with an arbitrary symmetry group and break all or part of it. The number of massless
bosons that remain is equal to the number of generators of the final symmetry group. For
the physically relevant electroweak symmetry breaking, local SU(2)×U(1) is broken, leaving
a residual U(1) symmetry group.
In Hesse’s classification, the broken gauge symmetry is a formal analogy because the con-
cept of local gauge symmetries is highly dependent on the shared theoretical framework—in
which the vertical relations are mathematical relations—employed by the models of supercon-
ductivity and the Higgs model. The shared mathematical structure is the infinite-dimensional
symmetry groups representing local symmetries, and the physical interpretations of this for-
malism may differ in the two domains.
There is a formal disanalogy accompanying this formal analogy: different symmetry
groups are broken. However, this is an irrelevant dissimilarity because the Abelian Higgs
model in which the U(1) symmetry is broken has the same essential features.
4.2 Formal analogies between the GL model and the Higgs model
(Table 2)
Many physicists and historians have noted the explicit formal similarity between the Higgs
potential and the GL equation. We identify three main formal analogies.
(a) In both instances the desired result is a symmetric Taylor expansion about some
nonzero value of the order parameter, and this is why the free energy expression (2) has the
same form as the Higgs potential (Table 2, row 3)
VH(φ) = µ
2|φ|2 + λ|φ|4. (14)
Coefficients multiplying odd powers of the order parameter are set to zero to ensure sym-
metry, and expansion to the fourth order is the lowest order expansion that leads to SSB.
In the case of the Higgs mechanism, this is also the largest renormalizable interaction term.
Many of the formal similarities between the GL model and the Higgs mechanism arise due
to this formal similarity. Though this “Mexican hat” form is shared by the two theories,
the terms arise in the context of parameters with different physical interpretations: in the
GL model these terms factor into the free energy density of the superconducting state, Fs
defined over space, while in the Higgs mechanism they arise in the Lagrangian L as the form
of an external potential over spacetime (Table 2, row 2). Since the mathematical form of the
free energy density (GL) and the external potential (Higgs) is the same, both only result in a
non-zero order parameter when the coefficient in multiplying the |φ|2 or |ψ|2 term is negative.
The fact that the similarity of the equations does not stem from some physical or material
analogy is evidenced by the origin of the “Mexican hat” terms. In both models there is no
attempt to explain the causal-dynamical origin of the terms; instead, the expression is added
by hand in order to force SSB. The “Mexican hat” terms are the simplest terms that give
rise to the desired result—critical point phase symmetry breakdown in the GL model and
avoidance of Goldstone’s theorem in the Higgs mechanism.
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(b) In both models, the order parameter is represented by a field parameter φ(x) or ψ(x).
(There is again a difference in physical interpretation: in the GL model, ψ(x) represents a
collective wavefunction for the superconducting electrons in the metal, while in the Higgs
mechanism, φ(x) represents some elementary scalar field that interacts with the gauge field.)
A formal difference is that ψ(x) is an ordinary function in non-relativistic quantum mechanics
and φ(x) is an operator-valued field (or, more rigorously, an operator-valued distribution).
Thus, the maps φ and ψ have different domains, images, and symmetry groups. In both
cases, the symmetry breaking occurs when the energy of the system is locally minimized at
|φ| = constant, dφ = 0. This is a consequence of the formal identity of the potential (Higgs)
and free energy density (GL), but bears being made explicit.
(c) Most importantly for dynamical accounts of the Higgs mechanism, both models pro-
vide a surface account of the processes they describe: the GL model is explicitly phenomeno-
logical, and there exists a “micro-theory”—the BCS theory—to explain the phenomena mod-
elled by Ginzburg and Landau, while the Higgs mechanism does not explain the form of the
Higgs potential, nor does it provide a causal “micro-theory” akin to the BCS model. This
has led physicists to pursue a dynamical model of SSB in the EW theory. We believe this
motivation is ill-founded, and discuss this issue in Sections 5.4 and 6.
Though the formal similarities are plentiful, there are some relevant disanalogies. For
example, the GL model contains a temperature-dependent expression for the order param-
eter, which is found to vanish above the critical temperature. No temperature-dependence
is given in the Higgs mechanism. This lack of external control of SSB is noted in Table 2
and discussed below. In (a), (b), and (c) above, the similarities are strictly formal: the same
mathematical expression is used in the Lagrangian of the Higgs mechanism as the free energy
density of the GL model, in both cases a gauge symmetry is broken, and in both cases the
order parameter is given by a field variable. There are fundamental differences in physical
interpretation accompanying the formal analogies. Without further analysis, then, it is safe
to say that the analogy between the GL model and the Higgs mechanism is obviously a
formal one. The vertical relations are similar simply because both models rely on the same
mathematical structure. After all, what else could it be but a formal analogy? There is very
little in the way of physical or causal content to the GL model that could supply a basis for
physical or material analogies to the Higgs mechanism.
4.3 Formal analogies between the BCS model and the Higgs model
(Table 3)
The formal analogies between the Higgs model and the BCS model are more superficial than
those between the Higgs model and the GL model, but formal analogies nevertheless exist.
For example, both models are obtained by rewriting their fundamental dynamical equation
(Lagrangian in the case of the Higgs mechanism, Hamiltonian in the case of BCS theory)
in terms of some sort of approximation, which amounts to introducing different fields from
those we started with. The Higgs mechanism deals with small excitation fields around the
minimum potential value, while BCS theory deals with the Bogoliubov-Valantin transformed
fields.
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Though this similarity is worth noting, there is more to be said. The approximation
used in BCS theory resulting in a broken gauge symmetry is only approximate short of
the thermodynamic limit. This is an important point to stress, since equations (5) and
(8) are physically and mathematically equivalent (the latter in a relevant sense, see Emch
(2007, section 5.1)) in the limit of an infinite superconductor. This is not so for the Higgs
mechanism: the approximation of small excitations near the vacuum state already arises in
the context of infinite degrees of freedom, and never becomes exact. It is instead justified
on the grounds that accessible experimental energies are very small, and so higher order
fluctuations are negligible.
Both models also contain order parameters to mark SSB. In the BCS model this is the
energy gap ∆, which is comparable to the vacuum expectation value of the initial scalar
field 〈0|φ |0〉 in the Higgs mechanism. These physically different terms play an analogous
role in the formalism of SSB: both serve as a litmus test for broken symmetry. In Hesse’s
classification, the similarities between BCS SSB and the Higgs mechanism are primarily sim-
ilarities of vertical relations: the fact that both mechanisms involve approximations is hardly
more than a methodological similarity, since most models employ some sort of mathematical
approximation technique.
5 Prospects for material or physical analogies
Given the fact that there exist formal analogies between the Higgs and both the BCS and
GL models of superconductivity, we turn to the prospects for deeper material and physical
analogies. Recall that material analogies map vertical relations in the source and target do-
mains that are causal relations of the same type; physical analogies have horizontal relations
that rely on physical similarities between the domains. Material or physical analogies would
support the transfer of aspects of the physical interpretation of SSB in superconductivity
models to SSB in the Higgs model. Material analogies are only possible between the BCS
and Higgs models because the GL model is phenomenological. There is the potential for
physical analogies with either the BCS or GL models. We argue that the analogies between
the BCS and GL models and the Higgs model are neither material nor physical because they
are accompanied by fundamental physical dissimilarities.
5.1 Physical disanalogy: SSB in the Higgs model is not a temporal
process
A crucial physical disanalogy between the Higgs mechanism and both the GL and BCS
models reveals itself in the physical interpretations of x and the horizontal analogue x (see
Tables 2 and 3): x in the Higgs model represents spacetime, whereas x in the models of
superconductivity represents space. The collective wave function and states in the BCS and
GL models are defined on space; the fields and states in the Higgs model are defined on
spacetime. Relatedly, the analogue of the free energy (GL) is the Lagrangian (Higgs). That
there is an analogical mapping from space in the superconductivity models to spacetime in
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the Higgs model would make it difficult to introduce a compatible analogical mapping from
time in superconductivity to time in the Higgs model.
In fact, under the analogical mapping set out in Tables 1-3, temporal processes in the
superconductivity models do not correspond to temporal processes in the Higgs model. A
temporal process is a process in which a system undergoes a transition from state1 at t1 to
state2 at t2. In the models of superconductivity, the temporal process of special interest is
that in which a superconductor undergoes a transition from a symmetric ground state at
t1 to a ground state in which symmetry is broken at t2. The ground states are the states
with lowest energy, so are picked out by the Hamiltonian (or Lagrangian). The free energy
in the GL model (Eq. (2)) and the Hamiltonians in the BCS model (Eq. (5) or (8)) are
both temperature-dependent and thus are time-dependent. In contrast, the corresponding
‘transition’ in the Higgs model is not a temporal process. For example, in the Abelian
Higgs model there is no corresponding temporal process in which the system undergoes a
transition from a symmetric vacuum state |0〉 at t1 to a vacuum state in which symmetry
is broken |0′〉 at t2. A vacuum state is also the lowest energy state, so is also picked out by
the Lagrangian (or Hamiltonian). The Lagrangian for the Abelian Higgs model (Eq. (9)) is
time-independent. The symmetric vacuum state |0〉 for the Lagrangian (9) with some fixed
mass µ (µ2 > 0) is a global state (i.e., defined over all of spacetime, not at a time). The
vacuum state with broken symmetry |0′〉 for the Lagrangian (9) with some other fixed value
µ′ ((µ′)2 < 0) is also a global state. Since |0〉 and |0′〉 are both global states and describe
different systems with different masses µ and µ′, there is no temporal process between |0〉
and |0′〉.
As Earman points out, considerations about whether SSB is a temporal process in the
Higgs model are closely tied to modality. He argues that “as long as the system of inter-
est is closed, there is no temporal evolution involved in spontaneous symmetry breaking in
QFT since every physically relevant state is asymmetric with respect to the symmetry of the
Lagrangian” (Earman (2003, p.337), Earman (2004, p.187)). For example, for the Abelian
Higgs Lagrangian with fixed µ′ ((µ′)2 < 0) all of the physically possible states—including
the vacuum states lying on the rim of the Mexican hat—are asymmetric. The symmetric
vacuum state is only physically possible in a different possible world with dynamics described
by a different Lagrangian with fixed µ (µ2 > 0). Earman also contrasts this feature of SSB
in QFT with SSB in classical mechanics and non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The un-
derlying reason for the difference between QFT and models of superconductivity constructed
using non-relativistic quantum mechanics is not the asymmetric Mexican hat structure of
the states—which the Higgs model shares with the GL model—but that the Mexican hat
potential appears in the time-dependent expression for free energy in the GL model and in
the time-independent Lagrangian in the Higgs model.
Modal differences between the Higgs and superconducting models are also illustrated
by the different statuses of the gauge bosons in the two cases. At the time at which the
temperature of the superconductor reaches Tc and SSB occurs, photons inside the supercon-
ductor undergo a transition from being long-range and massless to effectively short-range
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and effectively massive.17 Massless and massive are two possible states of the photon in
the sense that it is possible for the system to occupy the states at different times. In the
Higgs model, the W and Z bosons are massive at all times and there actually never were
(or are or are going to be) any massless W and Z bosons. In the physics literature, this
modal distinction is marked by the use of the terms state or mode to describe condensed
matter systems only, and the application of the term boson to both condensed matter and
particle physics systems. Marshak writes that, for global Abelian and non-Abelian groups,
the Goldstone theorem guarantees that SSB “gives rise to massless scalar (N-G18) states
in non-relativistic many-particle systems and to N-G bosons in QFT, and both condensed
matter and particle physics have been enriched by the recognition of the existence of N-G
excitations (whether states or bosons!)” (p. 219). States at a time in condensed matter
physics are contrasted with boson fields existing at all times in particle physics. (Whether
both are species of excitation in some interesting sense will be taken up below.)
A related feature of SSB in superconductivity is that, at one time, photons have different
effective masses inside and outside of a superconductor. In contrast, in particle physics,
SSB does not entail that there are sub-systems of the universe in which W and Z bosons
are massless and others in which they are massive. Anderson notes that there is a related
difference in the experiments that can be done to ascertain properties of superconductors
and particle physics systems (1963, pp. 440-441). It is possible for a solid state physicist
to get outside of a superconductor and impose an external electromagnetic field. This is
an experimental means of determining the response of the current to the electromagnetic
field. In contrast, in particle physics it is not possible to get outside of the vacuum state,
for instance, to impose an external electromagnetic field; the system takes up the entire
universe. The only means of experimentally detecting the response of the current to the
gauge field in particle physics is to introduce a charged test particle (which, of course, can
also be done in superconductors); however, this method does not allow experimenters to
directly determine the response function of the current because the test particle induces its
own gauge field. In QFT terms, we never find the “bare” properties of the field in question,
only the renormalized properties.
Put another way, time is an external parameter in the superconductivity models, but not
the Higgs model. Temperature is also an external parameter. The phase transition from a
‘normal’ metal to a superconducting metal can be induced by lowering the temperature below
Tc. The lack of an analogue of T in the Higgs model has already been noted. Presuming
that the universe is a closed system, there is no external parameter analogous to temperature
that induces a symmetry-breaking or -restoring phase transition.
The fact that superconductors are subsystems has further implications for the empirical
evidence available to support theories of SSB in superconductivity versus SSB in particle
physics. We have good evidence that the underlying symmetry in BCS theory is a physical
symmetry: quantum electrodynamics (QED) is thought to govern all electromagnetic phe-
nomena, of which superconductivity is a subset, and QED is manifestly U(1) gauge invariant.
17This is clearly an idealization. It takes time for the system to reach a new equilbrium state.
18Nambu-Goldstone
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As Kosso points out, “[g]iven the antecedent justification for believing in gauge symmetry
of the interaction, there is good reason to look for a mechanism that breaks the symmetry
in the superconductor” (2000, p. 365). In contrast, in the electroweak theory, all observable
phenomena occur with the symmetry already broken. There are no analogous empirical
grounds for inferring that there is an underlying symmetry that gets broken in this case.
Castellani (2003, pp. 321-2) urges that two senses of ‘symmetry breaking’ be kept distinct:
(i) “the [‘dynamical’] process by means of which the considered symmetry is broken” and (ii)
“a broken symmetry situation (or simply the fact that a symmetry is not there)”19. In terms
of this distinction, our conclusion is that both senses of symmetry breaking are applicable to
the models of superconductivity, but that only the latter is applicable to the Higgs model.
Finally, we again stress that the conclusions in this section are restricted to physical
analogies between superconductor models and the Higgs model component of the Standard
Model. The analogies to SSB in superconductors which inspired the Higgs model do not
establish that the corresponding SSB in the Higgs model is a temporal process and do not
identify an analogue of temperature in the Higgs model. Naturally, the fact that the analogy
with superconductivity which guided the introduction of SSB does not extend to time or
temperature does not entail that it is impossible to formulate a particle physics model in
which SSB is a temporal process or in which there is a temperature variable. Here are three
ways in which such a project could proceed:
1. model an open subsystem using QFT and introduce one or more external variables
2. introduce an explicit time-dependence in the mass parameter µ in the Lagrangian20
3. introduce a temperature variable into QFT (e.g., finite temperature field theory (Le Bel-
lac, 2000))
All of these strategies involve the development of new physics that builds on or replaces the
Higgs model. Of course, any model constructed along one of these lines would have to be
subject to empirical test to determine whether it is a better candidate for representing the
actual world than the Higgs model. For philosophers, the important point is that philo-
sophical analysis of a temporal process of SSB in particle physics would have to attend to
one of these alternative models, and not to the Higgs model component of the Standard
Model. Moreover, the analogies to superconductivity that inspired the introduction of SSB
19Castellani adds “the result of a symmetry-breaking process” to her characterization, which is of course
not applicable to SSB in the Higgs model, on our understanding.
20This is a variant on Earman’s example, in analogy with the example in classical mechanics of a bead on
a hoop which has a ground state that exhibits spontaneous symmetry breaking when the angular velocity is
above a critical value, of “a parameterized family of Lagrangians for a field such that there is a symmetry
of the Lagrangian that is unitarily implementable for the quantized field until, but not after, the parameter
attains a critical value” (2004, 187). (The example is presented in the algebraic framework for QFT—see
Sec. 5.2 below.) Earman remarks that “[a] request for a dynamical explanation of the change of value in
the parameter is perfectly in order” (ibid). We agree, but point out that (a) this is not an example of
“ubiquitous” symmetry breaking in Earman’s sense and (b) the Abelian and non-Abelian Higgs models are
not models in which the critical parameters in the Lagrangian vary.
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into particle physics in the first place do not furnish a basis for the new physics in these
models—the inspiration for the new physics must come from elsewhere.
5.2 Modality and SSB in algebraic QSM and QFT
The differences in the roles played by time in QSM and QFT are particularly transparent
in the algebraic formulations of the theories. For a brief introduction see Earman (2002,
2003) and for a comprehensive account see Ruetsche (2011). The algebraic framework casts
SSB in QSM and in QFT in the same mathematical form:21 “a symmetry α is broken in the
[algebraic] state ω on [algebra] A just in case α is not unitarily implementable on ω’s GNS
representation” (Ruetsche, 2011, p. 300).
Time already enters into the axioms for QSM and QFT in different ways. The Haag-
Kastler axioms for QFT associate algebras of observables with (open bounded) regions of
spacetime (see, e.g., Ruetsche (2011, Sec. 5.2)). Time translations are automorphisms
of the algebra. Algebraic axiomatizations of QSM associate algebras of observables with
(open bounded) regions of space (Ruetsche, 2011, Sec 5.4). As a consequence, treating time
evolution in QSM can be far from trivial, especially in the thermodynamic limit (Ruetsche,
2011, pp. 284-7). The different roles of time flagged in the preceding section are thus not
specific to models that exhibit SSB, but entirely generic differences between QFT and QSM.
Algebras of observables are defined over space in QSM and spacetime in QFT because
the former is a non-relativistic theory and the latter is a relativistic one. Relativity could
also be the underlying reason for the mapping of space in non-relativistic models of su-
perconductivity to spacetime in relativistic Higgs models. The algebraic axiomatization of
QFT furnishes a useful framework in which to isolate the consequences of relativity. The
ground states in the superconductivity models and the vacuum states in the Higgs models
are all lowest energy states. In addition, a vacuum state in a QFT is Poincare´ invariant.
Ruetsche argues that—in both the abstract algebraic representation and a concrete Hilbert
space representation constructed according to the GNS prescription—natural ways of inter-
preting the operators A(O) as representing operations performed in the spacetime region
O fail (pp. 110-111). The Vacuum and Primitive Causality axioms, which impose require-
ments of relativistic spacetime, are responsible. In particular, non-relativistic QSM admits a
Heisenberg picture-style interpretation in terms of time-independent algebraic states ω and a
time-dependent algebra of operators when there is an an automorphism αt representing time
translation:22 αt(A) is the time-evolved counterpart of A. Ruetsche argues that algebraic
QFT does not admit such a Heisenberg picture-style interpretation (p. 115). The problem
is that in QFT the analogous automorphism αt
23 cannot be interpreted as representing time
21Both QSM and QFT exhibit SSB in what Ruetsche labels the individual sense (defined here). Whether
QFT SSB also takes the form of SSB in the decompositional sense, as does QSM, is an open question
(Ruetsche 303-304 and Chapter 14).
22In some cases, there is no automorphism of the algebra that implements the dynamics (Ruetsche, 2011,
p. 284ff.).
23Details (for the example of Klein-Gordon theory in Minkowski spacetime and spacelike hypersurfaces
Σ1 and Σ2): “Where Σ1 and Σ2 are Cauchy surfaces and ι an identity map between them, [αt] is the
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evolution. Where Σ1 and Σ2 are spacelike hypersurfaces (and also Cauchy surfaces), αt does
not time evolve an element of algebra A(Σ1) to an element of algebra A(Σ2). This inter-
pretation is again blocked by the Primitive Causality axiom, which entails that any state ω
on A(Σ1) is also defined on A(Σ2). If αt were to represent time evolution of operators in
the Heisenberg picture-style representation, then it would represent time evolution of states
in the counterpart Schro¨dinger picture-style representation. However, αt cannot represent
the time evolution of states because ω is a global state; if ω represents the state on A(Σ1),
then ω ◦αt does not represent the state on A(Σ2) because (by Primitive Causality) the state
on A(Σ2) is also ω (p. 115). Of course, this does not entail that there is no time evolu-
tion in QFT. The point is that time evolution is represented in QFT by tying algebras of
observables to spacetime regions, and not by an automorphism of the algebra; in contrast,
non-relativistic QSM (or QM) ties algebras to regions of space, which permits time evolution
to be represented by an automorphism of the algebra. Any relativistic quantum theory that
seeks to represent SSB as a temporal process in one of the ways sketched at the end of
Sec. 5.1 is either going to have to work within these constraints of QFT or else revise the
principles underlying QFT.
The analysis of the differences in the roles of time and modality in the preceding section
also has implications for Ruetsche’s Coalesced Structures Argument. In QSM, the physical
states that induce the unitarily inequivalent representations are equilibrium states; in QFT,
the physically relevant states are the vacuum states. Ruetsche argues that, in order to
provide an adequate explanation of phase transitions, a theoretical framework for QSM
must have the capacity to represent multiple equilibrium states in different phases at the
same temperature, since it is possible for one system at the critical temperature to be in
one of a number of equilibrium states. This is a central plank of her Coalesced Structures
Argument. She tentatively suggests that the Coalesced Structures Argument also applies
to QFT. Our analysis of SSB in QFT highlights a difference in modal structure that would
need to be taken into account by any attempt to extend the Coalesced Structures Argument
to QFT. While in QSM the multiple equilibrium states at a critical temperature are all co-
possible in that they are accessible to a system at a time, this is not so for QFT, in which
the global vacuum states related by the broken symmetry do not represent states accessible
to a system at a time. One QSM system can occupy different equilibrium states at different
times, and may even exist in a superposition of equilibrium states at a critical temperature;
one QFT system cannot occupy different global vacuum states at different times and cannot
be in a superposition of global vacuum states. Moreover, distinct global vacuum states are
not even accessible to one system at different times. In addition, note that this difference in
physical interpretation is unrelated to issues about how to interpret a spontaneously broken
gauge symmetry (see Ruetsche (2011, pp.333-5)), in keeping with our separation of the two
issues.
automorphism of [the Weyl algebra] W corresponding to the symmetry of the classical solution space that
maps a solution with initial data φ on Σ1 to the solution whose initial data on Σ2 is the first solution’s Σ1
initial data, transferred to Σ2 by the identity map ι” (Ruetsche, 2011, p. 115).
25
5.3 Material analogy undermined
SSB in superconductors is a temporal process. Both the BCS and GL models offer de-
scriptions of temporal processes that include phase transitions during which symmetry is
spontaneously broken. The BCS model moreover offers a description of a causal process
during which symmetry is spontaneously broken. A causal process is a temporal process
satisfying some additional requirements. Clearly, since SSB in the Higgs model is not a
temporal process, it is not a causal process either. The argument does not depend on details
of accounts of causation (including whether retrocausality is admitted); the only relevant
feature of causal processes is that they are also temporal processes.
A consequence of the fact that SSB is not a causal process in the Higgs model is that
there cannot be material analogies between the BCS model and the Higgs model. Recall
that Hesse’s core requirement for material analogies is that the vertical relations in both the
source and target domains be causal relations of the same type. The BCS model presents
SSB as a causal process and offers an explanatory account of the causal relations underlying
SSB. However, the SSB analogue in the Higgs model is not a causal process (and thus there
is no account of causal relations in the Higgs model). Therefore, the analogies between the
BCS and Higgs models are not material analogies. It is possible that there are other physical
analogies between the BCS and Higgs models. This possibility will be investigated in the
remainder of this section.
5.4 The dynamical-phenomenological distinction does not carry
over to the electroweak theory
The Higgs model bears a closer formal analogy to the GL model than to the BCS model.
In particular, there is no analogue of composite Cooper pairs in the Higgs model. This
has inspired the thought that there may be a model of EW SSB that stands in the same
relationship to the Higgs model as the BCS model stands to the GL model (i.e., X : Higgs ::
BCS : GL). This line of reasoning is a motivation for the program of developing ‘dynamical’
models of SSB for the EW interaction, to be discussed in Sec. 6 below. Sticking to the Higgs
model for the moment, can the Higgs model be considered phenomenological in the same
sense as the GL model?
Recall the criteria that we used to classify the BCS model as a dynamical model and the
GL model as phenomenological one:
Table 4: Dynamical vs. Phenomenological Models
Dynamical BCS model Phenomenological GL model
1 causal explanations descriptions
2 micro-constituents collections of constituents
3 theoretical inputs empirical inputs
As we argued above, SSB in the EW theory is not a causal process. Thus, the first
distinction is inapplicable to EW theory. It is not merely the case that the Higgs model
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offers a description without offering a causal explanation of SSB, as does the GL model;
rather, there is no causal process in the course of which symmetry is broken, so no causal
explanation is possible. There is no missing causal explanation for a ‘dynamical’ model X
to supply.
The Higgs field and associated Higgs boson do not describe a collection of constituents,
as the Higgs model is generally understood. Recall that the centerpiece of the GL model is
the condensate wave function, which represents the collection of superconducting electrons—
a collection of elementary particles. In contrast, the Higgs boson is usually regarded as a
single elementary particle. This standard physical interpretation will be discussed in more
detail below, but the present point will stand: the Higgs model cannot be regarded as
phenomenological in the sense of describing collective phenomena rather than elementary
micro-constituents.
Regarding the third feature, the GL model counts as phenomenological because the con-
stants in the potential are empirically determined, and not predicted by the model (e.g.
the penetration depth d, and coherence length l). These are also experimentally and theo-
retically meaningful parameters that characterize and distinguish different superconductors.
One pragmatic virtue of the GL model is that it allows prediction of some empirical pa-
rameters when other known values are introduced. The Higgs potential contains unspecified
parameters, but few of these are experimentally determinable. As Marshak (1993) notes, λ
remains an unknown parameter (p. 223). Particle masses that arise as a consequence of the
Higgs mechanism are measurable, including the recent discovery of the Higgs boson itself.
However, these experiments were notoriously difficult to carry out and served as empirical
tests of the model rather than empirical inputs or a measurement of the predicted value of a
parameter. Additionally, the EW theory does predict mass ratios, determined by the weak
mixing angle θW . So various aspects are theoretical, while others are empirical. However,
the pragmatic virtue of the Higgs mechanism is that it preserves renormalizability of a the-
ory containing massive gauge bosons, not that it determines the actual mass relationships.
Criterion 3 is therefore not straightforwardly applicable to the Higgs mechanism.
The phenomenological-dynamical distinction does not apply to SSB in the EW theory.
None of the three features that comprise the phenomenological-dynamical distinction in
superconductivity are applicable to the Higgs mechanism. There is therefore no reason to
believe that there is a physically dynamical model that stands in the same relation to the
Higgs model that the BCS model stands to the GL model. That the Higgs model is ‘merely
phenomenological’ cannot therefore serve as a motivation for seeking out a ‘dynamical’ model
of SSB in analogy to the BCS model. Most significantly, there is no sense in which the
Higgs model supplies mere descriptions of SSB that cry out for deeper causal explanations.
After the GL model and other phenomenological models had been constructed, solid state
physicists were motivated to seek out an underlying dynamical model by the desire for a
causal explanation for superconductivity phenomenology. The search for ‘dynamical’ models
of SSB in particle physics cannot have the same motivation.
We do not want to suggest that the program of constructing models for the Higgs phenom-
ena by analogy to the BCS model is illegitimate. In the regime of interest near the critical
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temperature, the BCS model recovers all of the predictions of the GL model. As Gor’kov
showed, the GL equations are entailed by the BCS equations (under suitable assumptions).
As we shall discuss in the next section, an important feature of so-called dynamical models
of SSB in particle physics is that their predictions diverge from those of the Standard Model
at high energy scales. This program produces alternative Lagrangians to the Higgs La-
grangian, which form the basis for alternative, empirically inequivalent models to the Higgs
models. However, these alternatives should not be regarded as dynamical models underlying
or explaining the Higgs model.
5.5 Remarks on mass acquisition
An eating metaphor is often used in pedagogical presentations of the Higgs mechanism. For
example, in Marshak’s text, the standard presentation of the Abelian Higgs model rehearsed
in Sec. 3.3 above is followed by the explanation that “the ‘would-be’ Goldstone boson...
is manifestly gone (‘eaten up’) and has been converted into the longitudinal mode of the
vector (gauge) field” (p. 220). That is, the initial Lagrangian (9) contains a massless gauge
vector field, a Goldstone field that is presumed to be massless, and the final Lagrangian
(13)—rewritten with a different choice of gauge—contains a massive gauge vector field and
the massive (neutral) Higgs scalar field.24 Earman has memorably criticized the eating
metaphor that is often used for mass acquisition by gauge bosons in the context of SSB. The
objection is that rewriting the Lagrangian in a different gauge cannot cause the gauge vector
bosons or the Higgs boson to acquire mass because “a genuine property like mass cannot be
gained by eating descriptive fluff, which is just what gauge is” (2002, p. 1239).
The goal of this section is not to investigate this criticism pertaining to gauge invariance,
but to point out a different problem with the eating metaphor which is illuminated by
consideration of the analogy to superconductivity. Eating is a causal process: eating food
at t1 causes mass gain at t2. We have already argued that SSB in the EW theory is not
a temporal process and a fortiori not a causal process. At the intermediate stage of the
calculation outlined in Sec. 3.3, Marshak describes the Goldstone field as “the massless
‘would be’ Goldstone field” (p. 220, emphasis added). This phrase indicates that the eating
metaphor should not be read literally as describing a casual process. Nothing can gain mass
by eating counterfactual food. The eating metaphor is misleading about the ontological
status of mass acquisition in this respect. In order to understand what the eating metaphor
is intended to convey, the comparators need to be more carefully characterized. That is, what
is the massless ‘pre-eating’ scenario that is being compared with the massive ‘post-eating’
scenario?
The impression given by standard presentations of the Higgs mechanism such as Mar-
shak’s in Sec. 3.3 is that the comparison is between the initial Lagrangian (9)—interpreted as
representing a massless vector gauge boson Aµ with two degrees of freedom and a complex
(charged) scalar boson φ with two degrees of freedom—and the final Lagrangian (13)—
interpreted as representing a massive vector gauge boson Bµ with three degrees of freedom
24In his classic presentation of the Higgs mechanism, Coleman employs the eating metaphor in the same
way as Marshak (1985, pp.123-124).
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and a massive scalar neutral boson ρ(x) with one degree of freedom. Formally speaking, the
gauge boson absorbs one of the degrees of freedom of the complex scalar field. The Gold-
stone bosonic field only appears at an intermediate stage of the manipulation. However, the
role played by the Goldstone boson is obscured by questions surrounding how to interpret
the choice of gauge. But this is not the thread we will follow here. Instead, we will con-
sider the significance of mass acquisition in the original papers, including the gauge-invariant
treatment of the Abelian Higgs model in Higgs (1966).
Before surveying the options canvassed in the original papers, consider the following in-
terpretation of the eating metaphor, which is suggested by the analogy to superconductivity.
In superconductors, SSB is a temporal process. Prior to the phase transition, the photon
is massless; following the phase transition, the photon has an effective mass. One could
attempt to apply the eating metaphor to describe this causal process as follows: the photon
gains effective mass by ‘eating’ the phonon. However, this is not how the eating metaphor
is applied in either superconductivity or the EW theory. The eating metaphor does not de-
scribe this causal process. Instead, it is used to compare the Higgs model to a counterfactual
scenario.
Table 5: Possible interpretations of the eating metaphor.
A (‘pre-eating’) B (‘post-eating’)
Epistemic
interpretation
massless gauge boson + massless
Goldstone boson + SSB
massive gauge boson + massive
Higgs boson + SSB
Higgs 1964/1966
interpretation
Goldstone’s scalar field the-
ory (with massless Goldstone
bosons) + SSB
Goldstone’s scalar field coupled
to U(1) vector gauge field (with
massive gauge bosons) + SSB
Here is a survey of viable options for interpreting the objects of comparison in the eating
metaphor:
(1) Epistemic interpretation. Scenario A is the set of misconceptions about gauge theo-
ries with spontaneously broken symmetry that prevailed in particle physics circa 1960: that
gauge bosons are massless and that SSB is accompanied by massless Goldstone bosons.
Scenario B is the corrected understanding of the consequences of spontaneously broken sym-
metry that was introduced by Anderson, Higgs, and others. From our present perspective,
scenario A is not a consistent theory. The ‘would be’ massless Goldstone bosons are included
in the mistaken scenario A. There is no physical relationship between scenarios A and B.
(2) Higgs’ 1964 and 1966 interpretation with two Lagrangians (see also Higgs (2014, p.
852)). Scenario A is the scalar field theory that Goldstone used to illustrate Goldstone’s
theorem. The relationship between scenarios A and B is that the Lagrangian for A is identical
to the Lagrangian for B with the couplings for the terms containing the gauge field set to
zero. In scenario B, the ‘would be’ Goldstone boson is the Goldstone boson that would
accompany spontaneous symmetry breaking if the couplings for the terms containing the
gauge field were set to zero. As Higgs explains, “the longitudinal polarization of the massive
vector excitation replaces the massless scalar excitation which would occur in the absence of
coupling to the gauge field” (1966, p. 145).
Both options can appeal to the analogy to superconductivity as evidence that Goldstone’s
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theorem breaks down in the analogous situations in particle physics. However, further work
would have to be done to identify the assumptions of the theorem that fail. For example,
neither option specifies a resolution to Earman’s trilemma (2002, p. 1239).
Anderson (1963) does not analyze mass gain by comparing different Lagrangians, as
Higgs does in his slightly later papers, but he does consider the effects of turning on the
electromagnetic interaction. On this approach, scenarios A and B are related by a thought
experiment: if the coupling with the gauge field is initially switched off in scenario A, and
subsequently switched on in scenario B, then the Goldstone bosons disappear and the vector
gauge bosons become massive. In such a thought experiment, we could think of “eating”
occurring when the gauge field is switched on. This is clearly a thought experiment; it is not
possible to switch on and off the coupling to the gauge field. Anderson approaches the matter
from an experimental viewpoint, asking whether there is any way of experimentally deter-
mining the mass of the electromagnetic gauge field prior to turning on the electromagnetic
interaction. In particle physics, polarization of the vacuum physically reflects the response
of the current to the EM field and is represented mathematically by renormalization; in
solid state physics, the ground state of the plasma is also dependent on the response of the
current to the EM field. Is there a way to experimentally determine the mass of the gauge
field and the response function (especially whether it is finite) prior to turning on the EM
interaction? In both particle physics and solid state physics, the response function of the
current to the EM field cannot be determined directly by introducing a test particle because
the test particle introduces its own EM field. In solid state physics, we can get outside the
plasma and impose an external electromagnetic field. This is not possible in particle physics
because we cannot similarly get outside the vacuum.
In our view, both the epistemic and Higgs 1964/6 interpretations of the eating metaphor
are defensible. The main morals (on either interpretation) are that ‘eating’ is used to compare
counterfactual scenarios, not to describe a physical process, and that there were historical
reasons for comparing these particular counterfactual scenarios. Mass is gained relative to
a counterfactual scenario in which the ‘would be’ Goldstone bosons and ‘would be’ gauge
bosons are both massless. In the historical context of the early 1960s, this counterfactual
scenario was relevant because—from the epistemic perspective—particle physicists mistak-
enly believed that spontaneously broken gauge theories described massless gauge bosons
and massless Goldstone bosons, and no candidate massless, long-range particles had been
observed. From the perspective of a focus on the formalism, the counterfactual scenarios
presented by Goldstone’s theorem and gauge theories without SSB were relevant because,
again, each described massless particles. The important question concerning particle mass
was not “How do gauge bosons acquire mass?,” but “Is it possible for a gauge theory with
spontaneously broken symmetry to describe massive gauge bosons?” The former question
asks for a dynamical process in which gauge bosons undergo a transition from being massless
to massive; the latter asks about the representative capacity of a particular formalism. The
latter question captures the use to which the eating metaphor is put in describing the Higgs
model: there is a sense in which Yang-Mills theories without massive gauge bosons were
important to the historical development of the theory.
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There is another heuristic difference in the roles of mass acquisition in the development
of the theories of superconductivity and EW interactions. Though it is the case that, in
both BCS theory and the Higgs mechanism, long range force-carrying bosons are converted
to short range bosons, the significance of these conversions marks a relevant disanalogy.
Massive gauge bosons were necessary to explain the phenomenology of the weak interaction,
and the Higgs mechanism was deployed specifically to account for the masses of the weak
gauge bosons. On the other hand, it is only an explanatory artifact of BCS theory that the
photon becomes massive within the superconductor. Nothing about the phenomenology of
the Meissner effect required that photons become massive within the superconductor, only
that the magnetic field must vanish. Since the electric field vanishes in a normal conductor
without the photons within gaining an effective mass, a massive gauge boson could not have
been considered a necessary theoretical underpinning for the Meissner effect.
5.6 Anderson: “Maybe the Higgs boson is fictitious!”
Having identified many substantial physical disanalogies between the Higgs model and the
formal analogue models of superconductivity, we are now in a position to return to the
main question that motivated this paper: do analogies with superconductivity provide
any insight into the physical interpretation of the Higgs boson or the Higgs field?25 The
central physical disanalogies are the following: the formal analogical mappings do not map
temporal processes in superconductivity to temporal processes in particle physics, the causal
process of SSB in the BCS model is not mapped to a causal process in the Higgs model,
the phenomenological-dynamical distinction does not apply to the Higgs model and some
unknown model X, and the ‘eating’ metaphor is applied to describe a counterfactual theory
rather than a dynamical process. We have already noted that ‘particles’ in superconductor
models are defined over space and their properties (e.g., effective mass) may change over time.
This ontological status is indicated by use of the terms “state” and “mode” interchangeably
with particle terminology (e.g., “boson”). In contrast, the particles in the Higgs model are
defined over spacetime. They are never referred to as states or modes, only as particles (e.g.,
“boson”). In this subsection, we will investigate whether Miller’s political analogy based on
conductors or the historical analogies to the GL and BCS models supplies a plausible physical
interpretation for the Higgs field or the Higgs boson. Our conclusion is that the physical
disanalogies undermine attempts to export physical interpretations from condensed matter
physics to the Higgs model. We conclude by considering how Anderson’s recent speculation
that the Higgs boson is “fictitious” relates to our analysis.
To set up his political analogy, Miller (1993) explicitly uses an analogy to a conductor,
rather than a superconductor, to explain the physical meaning of the Higgs field and the
Higgs boson. Presumably, a conductor is chosen because this model is simpler and thus better
suited to his pedagogical purpose. In any case, one of the end points of his reasoning is an
explanation of why W and Z bosons have mass and photons do not, which as we have seen
was a central motivation for the historical superconductivity analogy. Margaret Thatcher
25For a discussion of the physical interpretations of the vacuum state in the Higgs model and the ground
state in the BCS model, see Morrison (2003).
31
effectively gains mass when she enters a crowd of (presumably Conservative) political party
workers because they cluster around her and make it more difficult to move around the room.
The analogy with solid state physics is that an electron moving through a crystal lattice of
positively charged ions gains effective mass because it attracts the lattice ions. The Higgs
field is the analogue of the crowd and the ionic lattice: “[t]he postulated Higgs field in
the vacuum is a sort of hypothetical lattice which fills our Universe” (p. 27). Ironically, in
Miller’s analogy the Higgs boson is analogous to a rumour spreading amongst the political
crowd. He explains that “[s]ince the information is carried by clusters of people, and since
it was clustering which gave extra mass to the ex-Prime Minister, then the rumour-carrying
clusters also have mass.” In terms of solid state physics, the analogue is phonons, which
are “waves of clustering” that propagate in a crystal lattice and are not due to the presence
of negatively charged particles. By analogy, the Higgs boson is “a clustering in the Higgs
field”(ibid). There is another irony here: the phonon is not a real particle, but a ‘quasi-
particle’.
Table 6: Miller’s political analogy
Politics Model of conductivity Higgs model
Crowd Lattice of ions Higgs field
Margaret Thatcher Electron W, Z bosons
Knot of people surrounding Thatcher Effective mass of electron Mass of W, Z bosons
Rumor-carrying cluster Phonon Higgs boson
Contrast the horizontal relations laid out in this table to those in Table 2 (analogies be-
tween the GL and Higgs models) and Table 3 (analogies between the BCS and Higgs models).
The horizontal relations identified by Miller are different from those drawn historically to
either the GL or BCS models. The underlying reason for the discrepancy is that while all
three sets of analogies share the same basic initial physical motivation, Miller’s analogy is
based entirely on this starting point and the historical analogies to the GL and BCS models
use the initial physical inspiration as a jumping-off point to develop a formal analogy, as
we have seen. The shared inspiration is that the models of conductors and superconductors
include effectively massive particles. Miller puts forward the mechanism for effective mass
gain in the electrons in the conductor as an explanation for the massiveness of the W and
Z bosons and the Higgs boson. In contrast, the effectively massive particles in the super-
conductivity models that motivated the analogies were the gauge bosons and the would-be
Goldstone bosons. The formal analogies to the GL and BCS models are centered around
the formal role of the order parameter in characterizing SSB. Since Miller’s analogy and the
historical analogies each identify different sets of horizontal relations, each will have to be
evaluated separately on whether it permits the transfer of the physical interpretation from
the model of superconductivity (or conductivity) to the Higgs model.
In Miller’s analogy, the Higgs field is analogous to the lattice of ions. This literal inter-
pretation of the Higgs field as being a sort of medium is reminiscent of the analogies to fluids
that guided the development of electromagnetism in the nineteenth century and the positing
of ether as a medium to support the propagation of electromagnetic waves. The analogy to
a lattice of ions clearly cannot supply a physical interpretation for the Higgs field—the Higgs
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field is not literally a lattice of charged particles. This interpretation is at odds with the
role that the Higgs field is standardly understood to play in the Higgs model. If the Higgs
field were itself a collection of particles—like the ether in models of electromagnetism in the
nineteenth century—then there would be a further project of classifying these constituent
particles in the Standard Model and detecting them. But there is no such project. Within
the Standard Model, the Higgs field is interpreted as being associated with the Higgs boson,
an elementary particle. The physical interpretation of the Higgs field cannot be based on
the fact that there is a charge distribution over the lattice points either because the Higgs
field is neutral.
Even if it cannot provide a physical interpretation for the Higgs field, does Miller’s analogy
nevertheless supply the basis for a physical interpretation of the Higgs boson? The phonon is
the analogue of the Higgs boson. A phonon is a collective excitation or collective oscillation
of the ions in the lattice. Consequently, the attempt to export this physical interpretation
to the Higgs model encounters the same difficulty: if the Higgs boson is the collective effect
of some collection of particles, these particles would have to play some role in the Standard
Model. The Higgs boson is typically taken to be an elementary constituent of the Standard
Model. In contrast, phonons are quasi-particles—they exhibit particle-like behaviour, but
are not fundamental particles.26
There is another obstacle to transferring the physical interpretation of the phonon to
the Higgs boson. The phonon is interpreted as being entirely an artifact of the medium—a
clustering of the medium, as Miller explains. The conductor, BCS, and GL models em-
ploy non-relativistic quantum mechanics; the Higgs model uses relativistic QFT. Anderson
recognized the implications for superconductivity models way back in his 1963 paper. In
the superconductivity model considered by Anderson, the quasi-particles are plasmons. The
solid state ground states are not relativistically invariant. A consequence is that there
are different frequencies associated with the transverse and longitudinal components of the
current in the superconductor (i.e., magnetic and electric components of polarizability are
different), while relativistic invariance (Anderson presumes) prohibits this asymmetry in
particle physics. A consequence of the different transverse and longitudinal frequencies in
superconductors is that the transverse frequencies are ascribed to a heavy photon while the
longitudinal frequencies are ascribed to a massive plasmon—and considered “entirely an at-
tribute of the plasma”—though in both cases the mass arises from the interaction between
the photon and the plasma. In Anderson’s words, the transverse modes “are considered
to result from modification of the propagation of real photons by the medium” (1963, p.
440). In a non-relativistic model, it is possible to interpret the transverse and longitudinal
components differently, which is necessary to regard plasmons or phonons as being an ar-
26There is a substantial literature on why QFTs cannot be interpreted as describing particle-like entities.
Ironically, one of the reasons for rejecting this interpretation is that quanta are not localizable to a finite
region of spacetime, which is a property that is shared by quasi-particles of this type! From Anderson (1963):
“In this case [i.e., conducting plasma type of vacuum], no net true charge remains localized in the region
of the dressed particle; all of the charge is carried ‘at infinity’ corresponding to the fact, well known in
the theory of metals, that all the charge carried by a quasi-particle in a plasma is actually on the surface.
Nonetheless, conservation of particles, if not of bare charge, is strictly maintained” (p. 441).
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tifact of the medium while maintaining that the photons or electrons gain effective mass.
In the historical context of the development of the Higgs model, these physical disanalo-
gies between the non-relativistic superconductor models and the relativistic particle physics
models was significant to particle physicists. As Higgs recalls many years later (commenting
on Anderson (1963)): “However, he did not show that there was a flaw in the Goldstone
theorem and he did not discuss any relativistic model, so particle theorists such as myself
received his remark with skepticism” (2014, p. 851). Additional formal analogies between
the non-relativistic superconductor models and the relativistic particle physics models had
to be identified before particle physicists could trust the analogies to superconductivity.
Miller’s analogy thus does not supply a physical interpretation for the Higgs field or Higgs
boson. The physical disanalogies between the superconductivity models and the Higgs model
generate the expectation that the formal analogies between the GL or BCS models and
the Higgs model will not support the exportation of the physical interpretation to particle
physics either. Does either the GL or BCS model defy these expectations? The closest formal
analogue of the Higgs field is the condensate wave function ψ(x) in the GL model, which
represents the collection of superconducting electrons. (ψ(x) is actually the analogue of the
complex scalar field φ(x) that appears in the initial Lagrangian, prior to the application of
the choice of gauge. The Higgs field ρ(x) in the final Lagrangian is related to φ(x) by a gauge
transformation and constant shift v. This point will be glossed over now, but deserves further
scrutiny.) Since ψ(x) is a quantum wave function in non-relativistic quantum mechanics and
the Higgs field ρ(x) is a quantum field, one would not expect the physical interpretation of
ψ(x) to carry over literally to ρ(x). And, indeed, it does not seem to make sense to interpret
ρ(x) as representing a collection of particles (by analogy to the collection of superconducting
electrons) for the same reason that it does not make sense to interpret the Higgs field as a
collection of lattice ions in Miller’s analogy.
The historically recognized set of formal analogies between the BCS and Higgs models
does not identify an analogue of either the Higgs field or the Higgs boson (though the
VEV of the Higgs field—the order parameter—does have an analogue). Very recently, it
was recognized that the analogue of the Higgs boson in the BCS model is the Anderson-
Bogoliubov collective mode. The Anderson-Bogoliubov mode is picked out as the analogue of
the Higgs boson because “in some sense” it is the amplitude mode for the order parameter
(Anderson, 2015, p. 93). That is, the (vertical) mathematical relationship between the
order parameter ∆ (the energy gap) and the Anderson-Bogoliubov mode in the BCS model
maps on to the mathematical relationship between the order parameter 〈0|φ(x) |0〉 and
the Higgs boson in the Higgs model. Perhaps surprisingly, it took even longer to obtain
experimental verification of the Anderson-Bogoliubov mode corresponding to the Higgs boson
in a superconductor than it did to obtain experimental evidence for the Higgs boson! (See
Anderson (2015) and Sherman et al. (2015).) Does the Anderson-Bogoliubov collective mode
supply an analogical template for physically interpreting the Higgs boson? As Anderson
explains, the Anderson-Bogoliubov mode “is not an actual particle” due to its collective
origin; it is a collective property of the superconductor. Thus, as in Miller’s analogy, the
collective nature of the Anderson-Bogoliubov mode is at odds with the elementary nature of
34
the Higgs boson: the Higgs boson is itself an elementary constituent, not a collection of other
elementary constituents, so is not given the same interpretation as the Anderson-Bogoliubov
mode.
There is a final twist to this formal analogy between the Higgs boson and the Anderson-
Bogoliubov mode. As already noted, there is no formal analogue of the Higgs field in the
BCS model. Reflecting on the formal analogy between the Anderson-Bogoliubov mode and
the Higgs boson, Anderson speculates (in 2015)
If superconductivity does not require an explicit Higgs in the Hamiltonian to
observe a Higgs mode, might the same be true for the 126 GeV mode [attributed
to the Higgs boson]? As far as I can interpret what is being said about the
numbers, I think that is entirely plausible. Maybe the Higgs boson is fictitious!
(2015, p. 93)
That is, there is no analogue of the Higgs field in the Hamiltonian (or Lagrangian) for
the BCS model. Anderson suggests that if it were possible—by formal analogy with the
BCS model—to write the Lagrangian for the EW theory in Higgs-less form, then by the
standards of physical interpretation that prevail in particle physics, there would be no Higgs
boson! Instead of transferring the physical interpretation from the BCS model to the Higgs
model, Anderson restricts his argument to the formal analogy and applies the standards of
physical interpretation established in particle physics. In quantum field theories, the mass
of an elementary particle appears in the coefficient of the squared term of the field in the
Lagrangian. For example, recall that the Lagrangian (13) in the textbook presentation of the
Higgs mechanism was interpreted as having a mass of gv because the Lagrangian contains
the term 1
2
(gv)2BµB
µ. However, there is no Higgs term in the BCS Hamiltonian; thus, if
there turns out to be a formally analogous Lagrangian for the Higgs model, then there would
turn out to be no Higgs boson!27 If this line of formal analogical reasoning were to pan out,
it would be a fitting finale to the saga of formal analogies to models of superconductivity
informing the development of the Higgs model.
5.7 Conclusion
We have argued that the analogy between SSB in superconductivity and the Higgs mechanism
is strictly formal—there is no material or physical analogy. Due to the lack of temporal
structure in the Higgs mechanism, the modality of SSB is different in the two cases, leading
to the absence of causal processes in the Higgs mechanism. This definitively rules out a
material analogy with superconductivity. Physical analogies are undermined in several ways:
the atemporality of the Higgs mechanism, the failure of the Higgs mechanism to fit on either
side of the dynamical-phenomenological distinction between the BCS and GL models, and
the failure of elementary gauge bosons to ‘gain’ mass in some sort of causal process. The
27N.B. This theory would still predict the experimental results that were taken to confirm the Higgs
boson—as the BCS model (or a refined successor of it) predicts the experimentally-measured Anderson-
Bogoliubov mode.
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formal analogy to the Higgs mechanism—as it currently stands in the Standard Model—is
tighter with the GL model than the BCS model; it may perhaps be fruitful to pursue a
successor theory in which the formal analogy is a better fit with the BCS model. These are
known as models of dynamical symmetry breaking, to which we turn our attention in the
next section.
6 Pursuing a closer analogy with the BCS model: ‘Dy-
namical’ models of EW SSB
The interest in developing an alternative to the Higgs model that is a closer analogue to
the BCS theory was natural from a heuristic standpoint: major progress had been made
by exploiting an analogy between BCS theory and the Dirac equation, so why not push the
analogy further? With the advent of SSB in particle physics, the floodgates of analogy seemed
to open. Some physicists regard SSB as the most important advance in the development of
the Standard Model. In the words of Jona-Lasinio: “Although [SSB] pervaded the physics of
condensed matter for a very long time, magnetism is a prominent example, its formalization
and the recognition of its importance has been an achievement of the second half of the XXth
century” (Jona-Lasinio, 2010, p. 2). The close formal analogy between the phenomenological
GL model and the Higgs mechanism, accompanied by the dynamical account of SSB in
the BCS model, inspired many particle physicists to pursue so-called dynamical symmetry
breaking models in particle physics (e.g., technicolor models). This particular strategy for
model-building was also motivated by other perceived shortcomings in the Higgs model. For
example, Lane lists the following motivations for technicolor:
1. Elementary Higgs models provide no dynamical explanation for electroweak symmetry
breaking.
2. Elementary Higgs models are unnatural, requiring fine tuning of parameters to enor-
mous precision.
3. Elementary Higgs models with grand unification have a hierarchy problem of widely
different energy scales.
4. Elementary Higgs models are trivial.
5. Elementary Higgs models provide no insight to flavor physics.(Lane, 2002, p. 3)
Our analysis in Sec. 5.4 entails that—in spite of the name—models of EW SSB that
are based on a closer analogy with the BCS model are not dynamical models in the usual
sense of the term. The BCS model is appropriately labeled “dynamical” because it supplies
a causal-dynamical account of the process of SSB described by the phenomenological GL
model. The Higgs model cannot be classified as a phenomenological model because (among
other reasons) it does not describe a temporal process of SSB; in contrast to the GL model,
the Higgs model does not demand a causal-dynamical model to underpin it (pace Lane’s
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first motivation). However, we shall stick to the conventional nomenclature of ‘dynamical’
SSB models in order to avoid confusion. The models examined in this section attempt to
go beyond the Higgs component of the Standard Model by positing a composite particle to
replace the elementary Higgs boson, in analogy to the Cooper pair bosons in the BCS model.
The goal is to develop an empirically adequate ‘dynamical’ model that is only dynamical
insofar as it aspires to the second and third characteristics of the dynamical BCS model: a
focus on micro-constituents (as opposed to collective phenomena) and theoretical inputs (as
opposed to empirical inputs).
There is an additional reason that ‘dynamical’ SSB models should not be regarded as
underpinning the Higgs model. The set of historical analogies between the BCS model and
the Higgs model does not include the Higgs boson (see Table 3). ‘Dynamical’ models of SSB
draw an analogy between the Higgs boson and the Cooper pair boson. This analogy is not
compatible with the set of historical analogies between the BCS model and the Higgs model.
Thus, ‘dynamical’ models do not extend the Higgs model by consistently extending the set
of analogies with the BCS model. Note that this apparently undermines the first of Lane’s
motivations above: though it is true that the Higgs mechanism does not provide a dynamical
explanation for SSB, neither does it leave theorists wanting a dynamical underpinning.
There are two possible categories into which any empirically successful successor to the
Higgs model might fall:
1. A successor model in which there is a genuine temporal and causal process of EW SSB.
The Lagrangian will take a different form from the Higgs Lagrangian. The model ap-
proximately matches correct predictions made by the Standard Model at low energies,
and will generate better or more accurate predictions where the Standard Model breaks
down at higher energies. In this case, the correct interpretation would be that this new
model is not a dynamical account of the Higgs mechanism as it stands in the Standard
Model. This would be a new, replacement model, in which SSB occurs as a conse-
quence of some dynamical process. The model could also supply a causal-dynamical
explanation for the occurrence of SSB.
2. A successor model in which there is no temporal (or causal) process of EW SSB. A
model of this type could still provide new insight into physics in the EW sector (e.g.
that the Higgs boson is actually a composite particle, or that the EW Lagrangian does
not include the Higgs field).
The ‘dynamical’ SSB models examined in this section are (in some cases empirically
unsuccessful) examples of category 2 models: the Higgs boson as a quark composite, elec-
troweak perturbation, and technicolor. These models were guided by analogies to Cooper
pairs in the BCS model. Category 1 models could include other models that radically alter
the physics of the Standard Model (e.g., string theory, loop quantum gravity, finite tempera-
ture field theory, etc.). In particular, finite temperature field theory does aim to incorporate
a temperature-dependent process of SSB. However, as far as we are aware, none of these
approaches to model-building beyond the Standard Model are premised on exploiting an
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analogy with Cooper pairs in the BCS model. We stress that our arguments in this section
are not intended to apply to finite temperature field theory or other attempts to develop
new physics that includes genuinely dynamical processes of SSB; we restrict our attention
to category 2 models motivated by analogies to the BCS model.
The success of any analogy in science—whether formal, physical, or material—must be
judged on the basis of the empirical adequacy of the model it generates. The first two
‘dynamical’ models in this section have already been rejected due to empirical inadequacy—
their predictions did not match experimental findings—while current minimal technicolor
models have yet to have those predictions which diverge from the Standard Model tested—
though a certain class of models with (relatively) low-energy divergences from the Standard
Model have been ruled out by recent experiments at the LHC (Sto¨ltzner, 2014).
6.1 The Higgs boson as a quark composite
In Marshak’s introductory particle physics book, the introduction to SSB is given via an
Abelian (U(1)) Higgs mechanism as in Sec. 3.3 above (Marshak 1993, Sec. 4.4a). After
introducing the basic mechanism—in which the choice of a particular gauge is exploited to
make explicit the manifestation of mass in the otherwise massless Nambu-Goldstone boson
—Marshak describes the application of “a quasi-Higgs SSB mechanism operating within the
framework of the U(1) gauge theory of electromagnetism”—low temperature superconduc-
tivity. Quasi-Higgs here means that, unlike the Higgs model, this model has a composite
boson in analogy to the composite Cooper pairs in the BCS model.
As Marshak explains, “From the vantage point of particle physics, the inverse of [l—the
coherence length] can be identified with the ‘quasi-Higgs mass’ of the ‘Cooper pair’... the
inverse of d [the penetration depth] is clearly of the form gν and has been identified with
the (transverse) magnetic modes of the ‘heavy photon’ ” (Marshak, 1993, p. 223). Thus
the equations describing superconductivity can be presented in such a way as to evoke the
analogy to QFT. The analogy is pushed too far—from formal to material—when Marshak
insinuates that it is the same mechanism behind phenomena in condensed matter and particle
physics. They share the same mathematical structure, but we cannot conclude from this that
the physical content is the same. Though the composite Higgs model shares greater formal
similarity with the BCS model, this is no guarantee of a physical analogy.
A key physical difference between superconductivity and the Higgs mechanism is that,
in electroweak symmetry breaking, the boson that emerges (the Higgs boson) is typically
taken to be an elementary particle, while the superconducting boson (the Cooper pair) is a
fermion condensate. At Marshak’s time of writing, however, this was not well established,
and this model postulates that the Higgs boson is actually a top quark condensate. Marshak
reasons that, since the acquisition of mass by the Nambu-Goldstone bosons “due to the Higgs
mechanism can be activated by a ‘fermion condensate’ (serving as a ‘quasi-Higgs particle’)
or result directly from the intervention of an ‘elementary’ Higgs particle,” (p. 219) and
“the mass of the still-unobserved t quark is moving upward to the range of 100GeV(> 92
GeV) [towards half the suspected Higgs scale], the Higgs mechanism for the SSB of the
electroweak group may, after all, be modelled after low temperature superconductivity”
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(Marshak, 1993, p. 226). This model is now obsolete since we now know that the top quark
mass (mt = 173.3GeV ) exceeds that of the Higgs. Thus the possibility of the Higgs being a
top quark condensate has been ruled out.
6.2 Electroweak perturbation
Quigg, in his paper on the progress of SSB in physics (Quigg, 2007) also describes some
approaches to dynamical electroweak symmetry breaking, which draw on an analogy with
BCS theory and branch off from Nambu’s effective theory of QCD. Since Nambu’s effective
theory is more closely analogous to the BCS model than the resulting EW theory, this too
counts as an attempt to form a tighter analogy with the BCS model. The first approach
described is a direct attempt to mimic BCS theory, which “interprets the dynamical origin
of the order parameter through the formation of correlated states of elementary fermions,
the Cooper pairs of electrons” (Quigg, 2007, p. 1031). This approach treats the electroweak
interaction, SU(2)L × U(1)Y , as a perturbation to the strong force, since the strong force
has much greater magnitude. As Quigg explains, “When we turn on the SU(2)L × U(1)Y
electroweak interaction, the electroweak gauge bosons couple to the axial currents and acquire
masses of order ∼ gfpi”, where g is the weak coupling constant, and fpi is the pion decay
constant, which is taken to be the coupling strength of the interaction between pions and
and the broken generators (Quigg, 2007, p. 1031). The mass ratios obtained from this
Nambu-like approach are in close agreement with those predicted by the conventional GWS
theory, with Mγ = 0, and
M2Z
M2W
=
1
cos2 θW
. (15)
Though this theory gets the qualitative features right, “[t]he masses acquired by the
intermediate [W and Z] bosons are 2500 times smaller than required for a successful low-
energy phenomenology; the W -boson mass is only MW ≈ 30MeV , because its scale is set by
fpi” (Quigg, 2007, p. 1032). Thus, this straightforward dynamical model is also ruled out by
empirical results.
6.3 Minimal Technicolor
Both of the approaches described above were attempts to extend the formal analogy with the
BCS model, and both failed to do so; they simply do not match up to known empirical data.
In the case of the quark composite model, the Higgs mass is not in the vicinity to be consistent
with quark condensates, while the electroweak perturbation model grossly underestimates
the mass of the W and Z bosons. The simplest approaches are thus abandoned, but the
BCS idea of dynamical symmetry breaking remains in a minimal technicolor model, which
would include not only the electroweak sector but QCD as well. In this theory a new
interaction—technicolor—is introduced, and the breaking of chiral technicolor symmetry
leads to a triplet of Goldstone bosons analogous to the pion triplet in Nambu’s effective
theory of QCD. Since these ‘technipions’ have not been observed, there is a freedom in
choosing their decay constant, and it is chosen such that the Standard Model masses of the
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weak vector bosons, formed from the technipions when the electroweak interaction is ‘turned
on’, are recovered. It is worth noting that there also exist a large number of technicolor
descendents—theories whose origin stems from variations to a minimal technicolor theory.
Sto¨ltzner (2014), in conjunction with the Wuppertal research group “Epistemology of the
LHC,” categorizes these models as dynamical symmetry breaking models of mass generation.
They share a guiding principle motivated by a ‘dynamical’ account of SSB, but differ widely
in their execution. There is a wide range of models in this category that posit additional
particles and forces which have been neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by experiment.
Proponents of the minimal technicolor model argue that it has theoretical virtues. For
example, Lane (quoted on p.36) argues that the model has greater explanatory power and
simplicity. Others have cast doubt on some of these claims. For example, Quigg points out
that even if the explanation of the origin of vector boson mass is achieved, the model “offers
no explanation for the origin of quark and lepton masses, because no Yukawa couplings are
generated between Higgs fields and quarks of leptons” (Quigg, 2007, p. 1051), and leaves us
with a further case of unexplained SSB. In any case, as with any application of analogical
reasoning as a heuristic, the ultimate determinant of whether the minimal technicolor model
(or one of its descendants) will be accepted is whether its novel empirical prediction of new
particles and forces are borne out by experiment.
Suppose that, at some point in the future, experimental results provide confirmation for
the minimal technicolor model. On the positive side, there will be a physical analogy between
the Cooper pairs in the BCS model and the Higgs boson in the minimal technicolor model;
the physical similarity is that both Cooper pairs and the Higgs boson are composed of more
fundamental particles. This explains the origin of mass of the Higgs boson as a composite
of elementary components. However, for all of the reasons laid out already, the minimal
technicolor model does not supply an account of a causal process of SSB in the course of
which the Higgs boson acquires mass. The explanation of the compositionality of various
particles (Higgs boson, W± and Z bosons) and the description of a new force of nature would
be substantial accomplishments, but would not supply a causal or dynamical explanation of
mass acquisition. We urge that this situation should in no way be regarded as problematic.
Once it is recognized that the dynamical-phenomenological distinction that holds between
the BCS and GL models does not carry over to particle physics, the Higgs model is not merely
phenomenological, and so does not require a dynamical model to underpin it. Indeed, we
would go even further and draw the moral that the heuristic strategy of using analogies to
develop new models need not be based on physical analogies; purely formal analogies can
play this role in some cases. The Higgs model—which has arguably been successful, even it
eventually is succeeded by another model—is a case in point.
7 Conclusion
The historical record provides ample evidence that analogies between superconductivity and
particle physics played an important heuristic role in the development of the Higgs model.
We have distinguished analogies to the GL and the BCS models of superconductivity, re-
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spectively, and have attempted to carefully disentangle the purely formal analogies from the
potential material and physical analogies. Our general conclusion is that both the set of
analogies between the GL and the Higgs models and the set of analogies between the BCS
and the Higgs models are formal; neither is physical nor material. Consequently, neither
analogies to the GL model nor analogies to the BCS model furnish a basis for a physical
interpretation of the Higgs model.
Material analogies to the GL model are ruled out at the outset because the GL model
does not describe causal structure. The purely formal nature of the analogies to the GL
model was indicated by the mathematical formalism on which the analogies were based: the
form of the potential in the Higgs Lagrangian and the GL expression for free energy. The
reason that these expressions take the same form is that both result from minimal expansions
in which higher order terms are discarded, which suggests that the similarity is not due to
the fact that the expressions represent the same physical content. A stronger reason for
characterizing the analogies as purely formal—and not physical—is that there are a number
of physical disanalogies between the formal analogues. The formal analogy does not map
temporal processes to temporal processes; space in the GL model is mapped to spacetime
in the Higgs model. The effective mass gain of photons and quasi-particles is a dynamical
process in the GL model, while W and Z bosons and the Higgs boson do not gain mass in
a dynamical process in the Higgs model. These physical disanalogies undermine a potential
physical analogy. The physical interpretation of the GL model cannot be exported to the
Higgs model. ψ(x), the condensate wave function in the GL model, is the formal analogue
of the Higgs field. ψ(x) represents a collection of particles; the Higgs field cannot similarly
be interpreted as representing a collection of particles.
The analogies between the BCS and Higgs models are also purely formal. The BCS
model offers a causal explanation of SSB; however, there is no material analogy between the
description of the causal process of SSB in superconductors and SSB in the Higgs model.
This is because SSB in the Higgs model is not a temporal process and a fortiori not a
causal process. A further consideration is that the Cooper pairs, which are the linchpin
of the BCS causal explanation of SSB, have no analogue in the Higgs model. Physical
disanalogies again supply evidence that the analogies between the BCS and Higgs models are
not physical analogies, but purely formal analogies. Recently it was realized that the formal
analogue of the Higgs boson is the Anderson-Bogoliubov mode. However, the Anderson-
Bogoliubov mode does not supply a template for physically interpreting the Higgs boson,
which is generally understood to be an elementary particle and not a collective phenomenon.
Anderson speculates that—if the formal analogy with the BCS model is pursued to its
ultimate conclusion—it will turn out that the Higgs boson is fictitious in the sense that the
Higgs field with which it is associated will not appear in the Lagrangian.
We also examined three ‘dynamical’ models of EW SSB which have been proposed as
successors to the Standard Model and which are based on analogies to the BCS model that
are tighter than those between the BCS and Higgs models. One of the original motivations
for developing ‘dynamical’ models of SSB was to find a dynamical model underlying the
Higgs model. Because the dynamical-phenomenological distinction that holds between the
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GL and BCS models does not carry over to particle physics, ‘dynamical’ models of SSB
do not supply a dynamical underpinning for the Higgs model in the manner that the BCS
model supplies a dynamical underpinning for the GL model. Furthermore, the analogies to
the BCS model invoked by the ‘dynamical’ models of SSB are inconsistent with the historical
analogies to the BCS model that informed the Higgs model. ‘Dynamical’ models do represent
deeper structure, however, in the sense that the bosons are replaced by composite particles.
The minimal technicolor model (and its descendants) have yet to be either confirmed or
disconfirmed by empirical evidence. If the minimal technicolor model is ultimately vindicated
by experiment, then there would be physical analogies between the Cooper pairs in the BCS
model and the pion triplets, but these physical analogies would be accompanied by the
aforementioned material disanalogies. (The fact that SSB is not a causal-dynamical process
in minimal technicolor models does not, of course, entail that it is impossible to devise a
model in which EW SSB is a causal-dynamical process. This is the goal of finite temperature
field theory, for example.)
Returning to the Standard Model, our conclusion is that formal analogies—rather than
material or physical analogies—to superconductors guided the construction of the Higgs
model. This conclusion might raise the worry (especially for scientific realists) that the
success of analogical reasoning in this case is left a mystery. Unquestionably, the Higgs
model has proven successful (even it gets supplanted by a successor model sometime in the
future) and analogies to superconductivity played a crucial role in the development of the
Higgs model. What is the explanation for the similarities in the formal structures used in
superconductor and EW models, if not physical or causal similarities between the systems
represented by these formal structures? Those whose distinctions we borrowed to frame this
case study, namely Hesse (1966) and Bartha (2010), would share this worry. However, a
closer examination of the historical situation reveals why formal analogies were needed and
why physical and material analogies would have been inappropriate. The problem in particle
physics circa 1960 was that there were a number of misconceptions about the representative
capacity of gauge theories with spontaneously broken symmetry: for example, that gauge
bosons are massless and that SSB in a gauge theory is necessarily accompanied by massless
gauge bosons. Formally, the BCS model is a gauge theory with spontaneously broken sym-
metry. Physicists first contemplated the BCS model of superconductivity as an analogue
for particle physics models because the gauge bosons are effectively massive. This suggested
the possibility of models of SSB in particle physics with massive gauge bosons. This possi-
bility was realized through the application of the formal analogies discussed in this paper.
Physical and material analogies to superconductivity would not have been appropriate for
addressing these misconceptions about the formalism because the mass acquisition that was
at the heart of the misconceptions in particle physics was not a physical process. The mass
gain that physicists examined was mass gain relative to counterfactual theories. The formal
analogy drew attention to a new range of possibilities for applying the formalism, re-opening
avenues that had been mistakenly foreclosed. In fact, a stronger point could arguably be
made: the physical disanalogies between superconductivity and particle physics actually
contributed to the heuristic usefulness of the formal analogy because the key features of the
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superconductivity model were accessible to experiment as a result of physical disanalogies.
For example, the Meissner effect: beyond a small penetration depth, neither electric nor
magnetic fields will be present within the superconductor, and the short range of the elec-
tromagnetic interaction is regarded as an indication of the effective mass of a photon. From
the vantage point of the completed Higgs model, the initial suspicion that there could be a
physical analogy between the effective mass of gauge bosons in superconductivity and the
mass of gauge bosons proved baseless; there is only a superficial physical similarity between
effective mass in superconductors and mass in EW interactions. However, the morals about
the representative capacity of the formalism in particle physics remained valid.
Another reason that merely formal analogies were heuristically useful in this case is
that the formal tools on which the formal analogies were based—perturbative expansion of
expressions for energy around a ground state, gauge theories, symmetries, SSB—have a wide
scope of applicability across different physical domains. These formal tools are general and
abstract; physical content particular to a domain is introduced by, for instance, choosing a
particular form for the Lagrangian or considering particular symmetries, and, moreover, by
giving a domain-specific physical interpretation of the formalism. Contrast this explanation
of the success of gauge theories with spontaneously broken symmetry with that offered by
Marshak:
While it is prudent not to push analogies between condensed matter and particle
physics too far, the fact remains that the Ginzburg-Landau equation is equiva-
lent to the Lagrangian of an Abelian gauged charged scalar field and that both
undergo SSB. The perceived relationship is certainly a tribute to our present-day
understanding of physical phenomena since the same SSB Higgs (or quasi-Higgs)
mechanism are invoked in condensed matter and particle physics despite the vast
disparity in energy scale [fractions of eVs in superconductivity in contrast to
hundreds of GeVs in particle physics—a factor of 1012 or more]. (p. 224)
We agree that it is not prudent to push analogies too far. We submit that this is a case in
which our success across scales reflects our success in understanding the formalism and its
structure, rather than an understanding of common physics of the physical phenomena.
A final reason that formal analogies to superconductivity were useful was because solid
state physicists had a much clearer physical interpretation of the physics underlying super-
conductivity phenomenology than particle physicists did of that underlying particle phe-
nomenology. Having an intuitive picture that goes along with a mathematical formalism
can aid with manipulating the mathematics. An abstract mathematical formalism can be
compatible with more than one intuitive physical picture (e.g., the wave equation). The
intuitive picture of the physical processes in superconductivity is inapplicable to particle
physics, but was still helpful in enabling physicists to grasp the range of consequences of the
formalism (e.g., massive gauge bosons). As long as the physical intuitions from the source
domain are not read literally as supplying a physical interpretation for the formalisms in the
target domain, they can be helpful for manipulating the same formalism in the new domain.
What, then, are we to make of appeals to analogies to superconductors to explain the
Higgs mechanism to the public or to students? The analogies do not illuminate the physical
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interpretation of the Higgs boson or the Higgs field and do not furnish a mechanism for mass
acquisition. For physics students, textbook presentations of the analogies can serve the same
purpose as for professional physicists: the intuitive physical picture of spontaneous symmetry
breaking in superconductors gives students something to visualize when they are applying a
similar formalism in the Higgs model. What does the public (including politicians) gain from
this type of analogy? Miller’s analogy to conductors does yield a type of explanation, but not
an ontological explanation. He offered the analogy as a response to William Waldegrave’s
question “What is the Higgs boson, and why do we want to find it?” The analogy does
address the second part of the question: as for any set of analogies—material, formal, or
physical—used as a heuristic to develop a new theory, the set of analogies described by
Miller raise the Higgs model as a theoretical possibility, but do not provide evidence that
this possibility is actualized. Empirical evidence is needed to confirm that, among the
possible models, the Higgs model is the correct one. Miller’s analogy illustrated the missing
piece of the puzzle, and supplied the requested explanation for building the LHC.
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